by Kristin Bricker
A nearly identical version of this article ran on the Security Sector Reform Resource Centre's blog and was featured in its July newsletter.
The United States and Jamaica celebrated the capture of Christopher “Dudus” Coke on June 24 after a 30-day manhunt that killed at least 73 Jamaicans, the overwhelming majority of them civilians. However, the arrest of one man does not mean that Jamaica has eliminated organized crime from the island, or even dismantled Coke’s organization, the Shower Posse. The Shower Posse has already survived the loss of one leader: Lester Lloyd Coke, Dudus’ father and founder of the Shower Posse, died in 1992 under suspicions circumstances in prison.
The United States formally requested Coke's extradition in August 2009. Following months of foot-dragging by Jamaica’s ruling party, which relied on Dudus Coke’s machine to deliver the votes necessary to remain in power, the manhunt for Jamaica’s most-wanted “Don” officially began at the end of May, the same week Washington launched the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
The CBSI is, according to the Obama administration, a “multiyear, multifaceted effort by the U.S. Government and Caribbean partners to develop a joint regional citizen safety strategy to tackle the full range of security and criminal threats to the Caribbean Basin.” In many ways, it is similar to previous anti-drug efforts such as Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative.
In 2010, the first year of the CBSI, the US Congress dedicated $21.1 million (just under 50 percent of the total Initiative) to “social justice and education programs.” This funding will be split among fifteen recipient countries. However, in his FY2011 budget request, President Obama signals that the CBSI might suffer the same fate as the Mérida Initiative: development aid dwindles as more resources are dedicated to military and law enforcement solutions. In FY2011, Obama has requested $79 million for the CBSI, of which only $17 million is for economic and social assistance. This trend is likely to continue, as the CBSI will eventually include a US vessel being deployed to the Caribbean to “provide training, logistical and maintenance support.”
Plan Colombia, which also included US military deployment, but on a much larger scale, failed to achieve its stated goal of reducing drug cultivation and production in that country, according to a Government Accountability Office report.
The US government claims that “Developing [the CBSI] became a priority as the Merida Initiative began yielding positive results in Mexico and Central America, making the Caribbean an increasingly attractive transit zone for transnational organized criminals, terrorists and illicit traffickers.” Nonetheless, the US government’s own International Narcotics Control Strategy Report appears to contradict this claim: Mexico’s drug production has increased over the course of Mexico’s military-led drug war, while drug seizures and eradication are down. The percentage of US-bound cocaine that passes through Mexico has remained constant at 90 percent.
Over the course of Mexico’s Mérida Initiative-supported war on drugs, the homicide rate has increased at a record-breaking rate, nearly doubling every year. Since the end of 2006, over 22,700 people have been killed in Mexico’s drug war. With an estimated 1,200 executions, June 2010 was the deadliest month of President Calderón’s term to date. The prevailing theory for why violence has spiraled out of control in Mexico is that the drug war has disrupted normal drug trafficking patterns, leaving chaos in their place.
Jamaican media celebrated the fact that Jamaica’s five-per-day murder rate tapered off following the police and military raids in Kingston as they searched for Coke. However, the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the 73 people killed in the raids may never be known: Jamaica sent a donated international ballistics expert home, and multiple problems have plagued the autopsies, leading to some bodies being buried without an autopsy. Survivors of the siege report widespread abuses by security forces.
Mexico’s experience, particularly that of the “deadliest city in the world,” Ciudad Juarez, shows that violence does indeed drop immediately following significant police and military operations. However, these lulls have always been temporary, and violence picks up again as organized crime adjusts to its new working conditions.
Even before Jamaican authorities captured Coke, there were fears that violence would fill the gap left by the loss of the “Don” Jamaicans refer to as “the President” and “Robin Hood.” Some of Jamaica’s most popular musicians, such as Bunny Wailer, Cecile, Twins of Twins, Mavado, and Vybz Kartel, rallied around Coke with songs such as “Don’t Touch the President” and “Which Dudus.” They and other Jamaicans—particularly those from Coke’s stronghold in Tivoli Gardens—argue that “the President” filled a role that the Jamaican government doesn’t. He brokered peace deals between warring gangs, paid for children’s school supplies, gave money to people when they were out of work, and bought medicine for the elderly. Supporters and admirers have repeatedly cited Coke’s social contributions—not a propensity for violence—as the reason he was more influential than the government in Tivoli Gardens, one of Jamaica’s most troubled neighborhoods.
This means that if Jamaica and the United States want to keep the peace on the Caribbean island, they have some big shoes to fill: those of Christopher “Dudus” Coke, the “Robin Hood from the Neighborhood.” At first glance, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, with its focus on law enforcement, appears to fall short.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Friday, July 2, 2010
Tensions and Violence Rise in Oaxaca As Elections Near
This is part of a longer article about San Juan Copala that won't be published before Oaxaca's state elections on July 4. I'm making this excerpt available here, because after this Sunday's elections, everything will change.
by Kristin Bricker
UPDATED JULY 5 to clarify UBISORT murder.
Violence in Oaxaca is increasing as state elections draw near. Nearly all of the opposition parties have formed an alliance against the ruling Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) and are backing one gubernatorial candidate, Gabino Cué. The PRI has ruled Oaxaca with an iron fist for the past eighty years.
While violence and elections always seem to go hand-in-hand in Oaxaca, the close race seems to be raising tensions to a boiling point. Section 22 of the teachers union, which lead the nonviolent uprising that nearly unseated Ruiz in 2006, remains on strike pending resolution of their contract negotiations with the state. Section 22 hasn't been on strike this long since 2006, when Ruiz attacked sleeping teachers and children in their protest encampment without warning, sparking the uprising. With Oaxaca's most important cultural and tourist event of the year, the Guelaguetza, following on the heels of the election, the state government has a lot of motivation to get the teachers off the streets...one way or another. On June 30 in Santo Domingo de Morelos, unidentified gunmen murdered the mayor and another high-ranking official. Both men were Section 22 teachers and members of the opposition Democratic Revolution Party (PRD).
Tensions are rising in the autonomous municipality of San Juan Copala as well, as the government debates whether or not it will send ballot boxes into the besieged area. Likewise, the autonomous municipality, which was formed with the goal of banishing political parties from the indigenous Triqui region, is debating whether or not it will allow the government to place the ballot boxes in the municipality. The Triquis who founded and support the autonomous municipality blame political parties for creating divisions within their communities. These divisions have lead to a situation in which much of the violence in the region is the result of Triquis killing other Triquis.
San Juan Copala declared itself autonomous following the 2006 nonviolent uprising that nearly drove out Oaxaca’s governor, Ulises Ruiz Ortiz. Founders of the autonomous municipality played an important role in the uprising as advisors to the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO), which coordinated the protests. The paramilitary organization Union for the Social Well-being of the Triqui Region (UBISORT), which was formed by the PRI in 1994 to keep the Zapatista uprising in the neighboring state of Chiapas from spilling over into Oaxaca.
In Copala, violent attacks appear to becoming more frequent as the elections draw near. Last week, snipers shot an eight-year-old girl and two women in San Juan Copala in two separate attacks. All three survived the shootings. On July 1, unidentified gunmen executed UBISORT leader* Severiano Flores.
* The Oaxacan media, which is very pro-government, claimed that Flores was an UBISORT leader. That same media, without providing a shred of proof, claimed that MULTI, the Triqui organization that is pushing for autonomy in the region, carried out the execution. Sources close to the autonomous municipality tell me that Flores wasn't an UBISORT leader. A member, yes, but a leader, no. He was murdered in a dispute that is unrelated to the fight over Triqui autonomy, and the UBISORT is only now claiming that he is a leader in order to blame the autonomous municipality of San Juan Copala. Who knows who is telling the truth, but that's the other side of the story.
by Kristin Bricker
UPDATED JULY 5 to clarify UBISORT murder.
Violence in Oaxaca is increasing as state elections draw near. Nearly all of the opposition parties have formed an alliance against the ruling Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) and are backing one gubernatorial candidate, Gabino Cué. The PRI has ruled Oaxaca with an iron fist for the past eighty years.
While violence and elections always seem to go hand-in-hand in Oaxaca, the close race seems to be raising tensions to a boiling point. Section 22 of the teachers union, which lead the nonviolent uprising that nearly unseated Ruiz in 2006, remains on strike pending resolution of their contract negotiations with the state. Section 22 hasn't been on strike this long since 2006, when Ruiz attacked sleeping teachers and children in their protest encampment without warning, sparking the uprising. With Oaxaca's most important cultural and tourist event of the year, the Guelaguetza, following on the heels of the election, the state government has a lot of motivation to get the teachers off the streets...one way or another. On June 30 in Santo Domingo de Morelos, unidentified gunmen murdered the mayor and another high-ranking official. Both men were Section 22 teachers and members of the opposition Democratic Revolution Party (PRD).
Tensions are rising in the autonomous municipality of San Juan Copala as well, as the government debates whether or not it will send ballot boxes into the besieged area. Likewise, the autonomous municipality, which was formed with the goal of banishing political parties from the indigenous Triqui region, is debating whether or not it will allow the government to place the ballot boxes in the municipality. The Triquis who founded and support the autonomous municipality blame political parties for creating divisions within their communities. These divisions have lead to a situation in which much of the violence in the region is the result of Triquis killing other Triquis.
San Juan Copala declared itself autonomous following the 2006 nonviolent uprising that nearly drove out Oaxaca’s governor, Ulises Ruiz Ortiz. Founders of the autonomous municipality played an important role in the uprising as advisors to the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO), which coordinated the protests. The paramilitary organization Union for the Social Well-being of the Triqui Region (UBISORT), which was formed by the PRI in 1994 to keep the Zapatista uprising in the neighboring state of Chiapas from spilling over into Oaxaca.
In Copala, violent attacks appear to becoming more frequent as the elections draw near. Last week, snipers shot an eight-year-old girl and two women in San Juan Copala in two separate attacks. All three survived the shootings. On July 1, unidentified gunmen executed UBISORT leader* Severiano Flores.
* The Oaxacan media, which is very pro-government, claimed that Flores was an UBISORT leader. That same media, without providing a shred of proof, claimed that MULTI, the Triqui organization that is pushing for autonomy in the region, carried out the execution. Sources close to the autonomous municipality tell me that Flores wasn't an UBISORT leader. A member, yes, but a leader, no. He was murdered in a dispute that is unrelated to the fight over Triqui autonomy, and the UBISORT is only now claiming that he is a leader in order to blame the autonomous municipality of San Juan Copala. Who knows who is telling the truth, but that's the other side of the story.
Thursday, July 1, 2010
Working Class Under the Gun: Mexico’s Other War
A shorter version of this article appears in the current issue of Left Turn magazine, which is on newsstands now, or can be purchased online.
by Kristin Bricker
Anyone who saw the police strapping on protective gear on October 10, 2009, probably thought they were preparing to battle organized crime. That night, six thousand militarized federal police deployed to Mexico City and four surrounding states. But they weren’t there to take down a drug cartel. Their orders were to bust the Mexican Electrical Workers Union, the SME.
Without warning, the police stormed government-owned power plants and substations and ordered all of the workers out at gunpoint. No pink slip, just the barrel of a gun—and instantly 44,000 workers found themselves jobless. Another 16,000 retirees saw their pensions disappear overnight. In one hour, President Felipe Calderon fired every member of the SME, one of the nation’s oldest and most powerful unions.
The move sent chills down the spine of every union worker in the country. Guadalupe Cervantes from the San Luis Potosi Independent Union of State Government Workers asked, “If the government can do something like this to the SME, what will it do to the rest of the unions?”
Calderon told the press that the government would provide the electrical workers with “assistance and training to find other jobs.” The President conveniently forgot that Mexico is currently experiencing what is arguably the worst employment crisis in the nation’s history. Laid-off electricians will have to get in line behind the millions of people who are already unemployed or severely underemployed.
Rising Prices
As if the lack of gainful employment weren’t enough, prices of basic necessities have skyrocketed during Calderon’s term. Since Calderon took office on December 1, 2006, the price of the canasta básica (the government’s official measure of the cost of feeding a family of five for one day) has risen 93%.
Experts blame food prices’ sharp increase on two factors: food scarcity and rising gasoline prices.
The federal government owns Mexico’s petroleum industry, as decreed by the constitution. Calderon has repeatedly increased the price of gas throughout his term in order to make up for budget shortfalls caused by the global economic crisis and the drug war. Higher gas prices mean that the cost of transportation and petroleum-based chemical fertilizers also increase, which translate into higher food prices.
Food prices are also rising because successive Mexican presidents have led Mexico down a path of neo-liberal globalization. Government policies are intentionally converting Mexico’s traditional peasant agriculture, which produces food for auto-consumption and domestic consumption, into industrial agriculture that produces for the global market. Monoculture is replacing the milpas, a peasant farming method in which several crops are mixed together in a single field. Following Hurricanes Stan and Wilma, for example, the Chiapas government offered economic incentives to peasants who converted their destroyed milpas into African palm plantations.
Some peasants have stopped working in agriculture altogether. Former President Carlos Salinas’ reform of the Mexican Constitution’s Article 27 made it legal to sell ejidos (communal peasant land) and use them as collateral for loans. Prior to the reform, ejidos belonged to the community and could only be inherited. The reform of Article 27 was a prerequisite for Mexico’s entry into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
NAFTA dealt a double blow to Mexico’s peasant farmers. It flooded Mexico with subsidized corn and other agricultural products from the United States, which destroyed the domestic market. Farmers, faced with cheap, imported, genetically modified competition, struggled to make ends meet. When they could no longer compete, they lost their land through sales and foreclosures, both made possible by the reform of Article 27.
The result is that Mexican farmland is no longer producing enough food for domestic consumption. It produces eucalyptus for wood pulp, African palm and soy for biofuels, and grain for livestock—all destined for the international market. In turn, Mexico is now dependent on imported food, regardless of what it might cost.
Thanks in large part to NAFTA, Mexico now sends approximately 80% of its exports to the United States. Exports constitute approximately 30% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP). When the US economy crashed and its effects rippled across the globe, demand for Mexico’s exports dropped, causing its GDP to plunge 6.5% in 2009.
With the economy shrinking and the country in the middle of an expensive war, Calderon had to come up with money for the federal budget somehow. In 2009, while many federal social and development experienced budget cuts, drug war spending increased. In 2010, with the country experiencing a full-blown economic crisis, Calderon increased drug war funding yet again. This year he expects to add 12,347 drug warriors to the military, Federal Police, and intelligence agencies. He funded these new positions by laying off 10,000 civilian government workers.
In addition to massive layoffs, Calderon funded his 2010 budget by raising taxes. The new higher tax covers a range of goods and services, including all imported goods. The higher rate taxes prices that were already inflated due to years of neo-liberal economic restructuring.
Government Neglect
Valle de Chalco is a working class town located along a major highway just outside of Mexico City. Many residents either commute to work in Mexico City or make a living in the informal economy, working in the local flea market or in workshops located in their homes.
The town was already feeling the effects of the economic crisis: the rising cost of living, stagnant wages, and layoffs mean that customers have less money to spend. But then things got much worse.
This past February, the Mexico City metropolitan area experienced unseasonable rains during what is generally the dry season. It rained for a week, swelling local streams.
Valle de Chalco is located next to the La Compania canal, which used to be a river. As the government authorized and funded new housing projects upstream, the amount of runoff, raw sewage, and industrial waste that was dumped into the river steadily increased. About twenty years ago, in order to accommodate rising water levels, the government began to pile sandbags and dirt along the riverbanks, turning the polluted river into a makeshift black water canal.
“Any time you drive down that highway [next to the canal] you see a bulldozer putting more and more dirt around the canal,” says Chalco resident Aurura Garcia Ruiz.
The canal, despite its haphazard construction, is equipped with floodgates and sump pumps—both of which require electricity in order to function.
Blackouts
The SME had a team of electricians that worked around the clock to repair potentially dangerous electrical outages, such as those that effect sump pumps and floodgates. When Calderon shut down the government-owned company where they worked, Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LyFC), he promised the public that 8,000 people could do the work that 44,000 SME members used to do.
Calderon turned LyFC’s grid and infrastructure over to the other government-owned electric company, the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). The union that represents CFE workers is a charro union—political parties control its leaders, and the union is pro-government and docile.
When the CFE took control of LyFC’s infrastructure, it subcontracted 200 workers to maintain the grid. The majority of those workers sleep in cots in a 10-meter by 20-meter tent that is reminiscent of an emergency storm shelter. The 200 workers share six cold-water showers and twelve latrines.
The SME's Secretary of the Interior, Humberto Montes de Oca, says the subcontractors are untrained and working under dangerous conditions. He says that many of them have been injured or killed on the job: he cited one man who was reportedly electrocuted and another who fell from a tower. "This is how the government wants to see all of us workers,” he said. “With miserable paychecks, in a tragic situation, without benefits, without a collective contract, and without a union."
Even with the help of 200 cheap, expendable subcontractors, it appears as though—contrary to what Calderon claims—8,000 CFE workers can’t maintain the grid that 44,000 SME members had maintained for over 100 years. Frequent and prolonged power outages have plagued the former LyFC grid ever since Calderon’s middle-of-the-night shotgun layoffs last October.
Unnatural Disaster
On February 3 and 4 during heavy unseasonable rains, the SME documented service interruptions that amounted to a “perfect storm” over the southern Mexico City metropolitan area. Four electrical substations that serve that area experienced “disturbances,” knocking out the power to southern Mexico City’s drain system, flood gates, and two sump pumps, one of which served the La Compania canal in Valle de Chalco.
The floodwaters began to rise in southern Mexico City as the rain filled the streets and rivers. With the sump pumps and floodgates inoperable, the water filled La Compania canal, pushing against its makeshift walls until they burst on February 5.
When the canal wall burst in front of Valle de Chalco, raw sewage and industrial runoff flooded the highway, killing five motorists.
“We blocked the street with sandbags,” recounts Luisa Lopez Santos. “We saw that the water reached a certain point and stopped rising, so we figured, 'Well, that's as high as it'll get, just like ten years ago.'”
However, when Valle de Chalco flooded ten years ago, the drainage system and sump pumps were operational.
“To our surprise,” says Lopez Santos, “the water started coming up out of the drains, the foundations of the houses, in the gardens...water started gushing out from everywhere.”
The SME documented electrical failures in the area throughout the week, which caused the floodwaters to retreat much slower than normal. Valle de Chalco was under raw sewage for thirteen days. In some areas, the dirty water filled houses’ entire first floors.
Chalco residents went at least 15 days without work. Many of those who commuted to Mexico City for work lost their jobs for failure to show. “People couldn't get to work,” says Garcia Ruiz. “The street was full of water and cars and buses."
Those who work in Chalco saw their livelihoods washed away along with their homes. Everyone is finding it difficult to pick up the pieces.
“We sell in the flea market, and our sales have dropped a lot,” says Lopez Santos. “People who before bought a half kilo of peppers are now buying a quarter kilo because they don't have work.”
Flood survivors criticize the government’s response to the flood. The government gave MX$20,000 ($1,640 USD) to each family affected by the flood, regardless of the damage sustained to their homes or how many people are in each family. Residents who lost their home-based businesses received no extra aid. Rather than disinfecting homes and helping families remove their belongings that had been soaking in raw sewage for over two weeks, teams of government workers merely pushed the “mud” out of houses with brooms and gave every family a bucket of paint and a bottle of bleach.
A government aid worker who spoke to Left Turn on condition of anonymity says that many families aren’t receiving the little aid they are entitled to: “A lot of property owners are taking advantage to collect the aid that is owed to their renters.”
Furthermore, the aid worker says, “We have to determine the number of families in a building by the number of kitchens.” Many poor Mexican families rent one room for their entire family and share a kitchen with other renters. This means that five poor families who rent rooms in a building with a shared kitchen split $20,000 in aid.
The $20,000 the government gave flood victims came in the form of vouchers that they could only use in select chain stores, making it impossible to shop around for the best price or buy used. This means that flood victims can’t stretch the $20,000 vouchers as far as they could stretch cash. “There's a lot of people who, when they got their vouchers and figured out that they could only use them to buy a few things, decided to wash their beds,” says Garcia Ruiz.
Chalco residents are feeling the consequences of sleeping on dirty beds in dirty houses. They have skin infections, respiratory infections, eye infections, sore throats, allergies, infected lesions: all the result of living in and breathing the filth and dust that the raw sewage left in their homes and neighborhoods. But the government’s medical teams came and left immediately following the flood, and they don’t plan to return. The government also never sent psychologists to help residents through shock and post-traumatic stress disorder.
The Coordinadora Valle de Chalco, a local coalition that is part of the Zapatistas’ Other Campaign, has stepped up to fill the gap left by the government’s criminal neglect. Through community work, they are proving that organized people can meet their own needs better than the government can.
On February 5, when the floodwaters first began to rise, the Coordinadora mobilized to help residents move their belongings to the second floor of their homes. They helped neighbors pile sandbags in the streets in an attempt to stop the floodwaters’ advance.
“We initially provided human labor for the most part,” explains Coordinadora member Rafael Garfias. “Later, donations of food and money began to arrive from the Other Campaign in Mexico City and Mexico State, so we started to distribute that as well. We started to videotape and take photos so that people on the outside would know what was happening here. Two days after the flooding, the government began to say that everything was under control, that people were fine, that no one should worry. So we began to issue communiqués about the military and police presence. There were no aid workers. They sent the military. The Navy. The police… this was their first response.”
When the floodwaters retreated, the Coordinadora organized an autonomous needs assessment to determine its response to the disaster. This set them apart from the political parties and factions who wanted to capitalize on the disaster. “Right now we’re not interesting in shutting down highways or occupying the town hall,” argues Garfias. “The Other Campaign’s slogan, ‘From below and to the left,’ is not empty rhetoric. It means that if the government doesn’t care about us, we have an urgent task at hand. We need to help our people get through the shock, be there with them. If they decide to shut down a road, we’ll be there with them. But we asked, ‘What do you want? What do you need? How can we help?’ And they told us, ‘We need medical attention. We need for the kids to get past their trauma.’”
So, instead of a protest, the Coordinadora organized a fair in the church. Church ladies distributed donated food and clothing while doctors from the Other Campaign provided free exams and medicine. A hairdresser donated her labor and cut kids’ hair while musicians sang. Psychologists from the Other Campaign will visit the community soon.
“The path is clear: from below and to the left,” says Garfias. “What’s important now is the community work that will give us the strength to begin bigger projects and keep organizing."
by Kristin Bricker
Anyone who saw the police strapping on protective gear on October 10, 2009, probably thought they were preparing to battle organized crime. That night, six thousand militarized federal police deployed to Mexico City and four surrounding states. But they weren’t there to take down a drug cartel. Their orders were to bust the Mexican Electrical Workers Union, the SME.
Without warning, the police stormed government-owned power plants and substations and ordered all of the workers out at gunpoint. No pink slip, just the barrel of a gun—and instantly 44,000 workers found themselves jobless. Another 16,000 retirees saw their pensions disappear overnight. In one hour, President Felipe Calderon fired every member of the SME, one of the nation’s oldest and most powerful unions.
The move sent chills down the spine of every union worker in the country. Guadalupe Cervantes from the San Luis Potosi Independent Union of State Government Workers asked, “If the government can do something like this to the SME, what will it do to the rest of the unions?”
Calderon told the press that the government would provide the electrical workers with “assistance and training to find other jobs.” The President conveniently forgot that Mexico is currently experiencing what is arguably the worst employment crisis in the nation’s history. Laid-off electricians will have to get in line behind the millions of people who are already unemployed or severely underemployed.
Rising Prices
As if the lack of gainful employment weren’t enough, prices of basic necessities have skyrocketed during Calderon’s term. Since Calderon took office on December 1, 2006, the price of the canasta básica (the government’s official measure of the cost of feeding a family of five for one day) has risen 93%.
Experts blame food prices’ sharp increase on two factors: food scarcity and rising gasoline prices.
The federal government owns Mexico’s petroleum industry, as decreed by the constitution. Calderon has repeatedly increased the price of gas throughout his term in order to make up for budget shortfalls caused by the global economic crisis and the drug war. Higher gas prices mean that the cost of transportation and petroleum-based chemical fertilizers also increase, which translate into higher food prices.
Food prices are also rising because successive Mexican presidents have led Mexico down a path of neo-liberal globalization. Government policies are intentionally converting Mexico’s traditional peasant agriculture, which produces food for auto-consumption and domestic consumption, into industrial agriculture that produces for the global market. Monoculture is replacing the milpas, a peasant farming method in which several crops are mixed together in a single field. Following Hurricanes Stan and Wilma, for example, the Chiapas government offered economic incentives to peasants who converted their destroyed milpas into African palm plantations.
Some peasants have stopped working in agriculture altogether. Former President Carlos Salinas’ reform of the Mexican Constitution’s Article 27 made it legal to sell ejidos (communal peasant land) and use them as collateral for loans. Prior to the reform, ejidos belonged to the community and could only be inherited. The reform of Article 27 was a prerequisite for Mexico’s entry into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
NAFTA dealt a double blow to Mexico’s peasant farmers. It flooded Mexico with subsidized corn and other agricultural products from the United States, which destroyed the domestic market. Farmers, faced with cheap, imported, genetically modified competition, struggled to make ends meet. When they could no longer compete, they lost their land through sales and foreclosures, both made possible by the reform of Article 27.
The result is that Mexican farmland is no longer producing enough food for domestic consumption. It produces eucalyptus for wood pulp, African palm and soy for biofuels, and grain for livestock—all destined for the international market. In turn, Mexico is now dependent on imported food, regardless of what it might cost.
Thanks in large part to NAFTA, Mexico now sends approximately 80% of its exports to the United States. Exports constitute approximately 30% of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP). When the US economy crashed and its effects rippled across the globe, demand for Mexico’s exports dropped, causing its GDP to plunge 6.5% in 2009.
With the economy shrinking and the country in the middle of an expensive war, Calderon had to come up with money for the federal budget somehow. In 2009, while many federal social and development experienced budget cuts, drug war spending increased. In 2010, with the country experiencing a full-blown economic crisis, Calderon increased drug war funding yet again. This year he expects to add 12,347 drug warriors to the military, Federal Police, and intelligence agencies. He funded these new positions by laying off 10,000 civilian government workers.
In addition to massive layoffs, Calderon funded his 2010 budget by raising taxes. The new higher tax covers a range of goods and services, including all imported goods. The higher rate taxes prices that were already inflated due to years of neo-liberal economic restructuring.
Government Neglect
Valle de Chalco is a working class town located along a major highway just outside of Mexico City. Many residents either commute to work in Mexico City or make a living in the informal economy, working in the local flea market or in workshops located in their homes.
The town was already feeling the effects of the economic crisis: the rising cost of living, stagnant wages, and layoffs mean that customers have less money to spend. But then things got much worse.
This past February, the Mexico City metropolitan area experienced unseasonable rains during what is generally the dry season. It rained for a week, swelling local streams.
Valle de Chalco is located next to the La Compania canal, which used to be a river. As the government authorized and funded new housing projects upstream, the amount of runoff, raw sewage, and industrial waste that was dumped into the river steadily increased. About twenty years ago, in order to accommodate rising water levels, the government began to pile sandbags and dirt along the riverbanks, turning the polluted river into a makeshift black water canal.
“Any time you drive down that highway [next to the canal] you see a bulldozer putting more and more dirt around the canal,” says Chalco resident Aurura Garcia Ruiz.
The canal, despite its haphazard construction, is equipped with floodgates and sump pumps—both of which require electricity in order to function.
Blackouts
The SME had a team of electricians that worked around the clock to repair potentially dangerous electrical outages, such as those that effect sump pumps and floodgates. When Calderon shut down the government-owned company where they worked, Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LyFC), he promised the public that 8,000 people could do the work that 44,000 SME members used to do.
Calderon turned LyFC’s grid and infrastructure over to the other government-owned electric company, the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). The union that represents CFE workers is a charro union—political parties control its leaders, and the union is pro-government and docile.
When the CFE took control of LyFC’s infrastructure, it subcontracted 200 workers to maintain the grid. The majority of those workers sleep in cots in a 10-meter by 20-meter tent that is reminiscent of an emergency storm shelter. The 200 workers share six cold-water showers and twelve latrines.
The SME's Secretary of the Interior, Humberto Montes de Oca, says the subcontractors are untrained and working under dangerous conditions. He says that many of them have been injured or killed on the job: he cited one man who was reportedly electrocuted and another who fell from a tower. "This is how the government wants to see all of us workers,” he said. “With miserable paychecks, in a tragic situation, without benefits, without a collective contract, and without a union."
Even with the help of 200 cheap, expendable subcontractors, it appears as though—contrary to what Calderon claims—8,000 CFE workers can’t maintain the grid that 44,000 SME members had maintained for over 100 years. Frequent and prolonged power outages have plagued the former LyFC grid ever since Calderon’s middle-of-the-night shotgun layoffs last October.
Unnatural Disaster
On February 3 and 4 during heavy unseasonable rains, the SME documented service interruptions that amounted to a “perfect storm” over the southern Mexico City metropolitan area. Four electrical substations that serve that area experienced “disturbances,” knocking out the power to southern Mexico City’s drain system, flood gates, and two sump pumps, one of which served the La Compania canal in Valle de Chalco.
The floodwaters began to rise in southern Mexico City as the rain filled the streets and rivers. With the sump pumps and floodgates inoperable, the water filled La Compania canal, pushing against its makeshift walls until they burst on February 5.
When the canal wall burst in front of Valle de Chalco, raw sewage and industrial runoff flooded the highway, killing five motorists.
“We blocked the street with sandbags,” recounts Luisa Lopez Santos. “We saw that the water reached a certain point and stopped rising, so we figured, 'Well, that's as high as it'll get, just like ten years ago.'”
However, when Valle de Chalco flooded ten years ago, the drainage system and sump pumps were operational.
“To our surprise,” says Lopez Santos, “the water started coming up out of the drains, the foundations of the houses, in the gardens...water started gushing out from everywhere.”
The SME documented electrical failures in the area throughout the week, which caused the floodwaters to retreat much slower than normal. Valle de Chalco was under raw sewage for thirteen days. In some areas, the dirty water filled houses’ entire first floors.
Chalco residents went at least 15 days without work. Many of those who commuted to Mexico City for work lost their jobs for failure to show. “People couldn't get to work,” says Garcia Ruiz. “The street was full of water and cars and buses."
Those who work in Chalco saw their livelihoods washed away along with their homes. Everyone is finding it difficult to pick up the pieces.
“We sell in the flea market, and our sales have dropped a lot,” says Lopez Santos. “People who before bought a half kilo of peppers are now buying a quarter kilo because they don't have work.”
Flood survivors criticize the government’s response to the flood. The government gave MX$20,000 ($1,640 USD) to each family affected by the flood, regardless of the damage sustained to their homes or how many people are in each family. Residents who lost their home-based businesses received no extra aid. Rather than disinfecting homes and helping families remove their belongings that had been soaking in raw sewage for over two weeks, teams of government workers merely pushed the “mud” out of houses with brooms and gave every family a bucket of paint and a bottle of bleach.
A government aid worker who spoke to Left Turn on condition of anonymity says that many families aren’t receiving the little aid they are entitled to: “A lot of property owners are taking advantage to collect the aid that is owed to their renters.”
Furthermore, the aid worker says, “We have to determine the number of families in a building by the number of kitchens.” Many poor Mexican families rent one room for their entire family and share a kitchen with other renters. This means that five poor families who rent rooms in a building with a shared kitchen split $20,000 in aid.
The $20,000 the government gave flood victims came in the form of vouchers that they could only use in select chain stores, making it impossible to shop around for the best price or buy used. This means that flood victims can’t stretch the $20,000 vouchers as far as they could stretch cash. “There's a lot of people who, when they got their vouchers and figured out that they could only use them to buy a few things, decided to wash their beds,” says Garcia Ruiz.
Chalco residents are feeling the consequences of sleeping on dirty beds in dirty houses. They have skin infections, respiratory infections, eye infections, sore throats, allergies, infected lesions: all the result of living in and breathing the filth and dust that the raw sewage left in their homes and neighborhoods. But the government’s medical teams came and left immediately following the flood, and they don’t plan to return. The government also never sent psychologists to help residents through shock and post-traumatic stress disorder.
The Coordinadora Valle de Chalco, a local coalition that is part of the Zapatistas’ Other Campaign, has stepped up to fill the gap left by the government’s criminal neglect. Through community work, they are proving that organized people can meet their own needs better than the government can.
On February 5, when the floodwaters first began to rise, the Coordinadora mobilized to help residents move their belongings to the second floor of their homes. They helped neighbors pile sandbags in the streets in an attempt to stop the floodwaters’ advance.
“We initially provided human labor for the most part,” explains Coordinadora member Rafael Garfias. “Later, donations of food and money began to arrive from the Other Campaign in Mexico City and Mexico State, so we started to distribute that as well. We started to videotape and take photos so that people on the outside would know what was happening here. Two days after the flooding, the government began to say that everything was under control, that people were fine, that no one should worry. So we began to issue communiqués about the military and police presence. There were no aid workers. They sent the military. The Navy. The police… this was their first response.”
When the floodwaters retreated, the Coordinadora organized an autonomous needs assessment to determine its response to the disaster. This set them apart from the political parties and factions who wanted to capitalize on the disaster. “Right now we’re not interesting in shutting down highways or occupying the town hall,” argues Garfias. “The Other Campaign’s slogan, ‘From below and to the left,’ is not empty rhetoric. It means that if the government doesn’t care about us, we have an urgent task at hand. We need to help our people get through the shock, be there with them. If they decide to shut down a road, we’ll be there with them. But we asked, ‘What do you want? What do you need? How can we help?’ And they told us, ‘We need medical attention. We need for the kids to get past their trauma.’”
So, instead of a protest, the Coordinadora organized a fair in the church. Church ladies distributed donated food and clothing while doctors from the Other Campaign provided free exams and medicine. A hairdresser donated her labor and cut kids’ hair while musicians sang. Psychologists from the Other Campaign will visit the community soon.
“The path is clear: from below and to the left,” says Garfias. “What’s important now is the community work that will give us the strength to begin bigger projects and keep organizing."
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Mexican Police Raid Battered Women's Shelters in Monterrey, Cancun, and Ciudad Juarez
by Frontera NorteSur
In Mexico, not even shelters for victims of domestic violence are safe from trouble. Recently, refuges for battered women and children have been the object of police raids in Monterrey, Cancun and Ciudad Juarez.
In the tourist resort of Cancun, municipal police searching for a woman attempted to enter the Center for the Integral Attention of Women, a shelter directed by well-known women’s rights advocate and journalist Lydia Cacho, late last month. Center staff, however, successfully blocked the armed men from entering the building.
A shelter in Ciudad Juarez wasn’t so lucky. On June 9, a group of 14 men, several of whom were armed with high-powered weapons, showed up at the “Without Violence” safe house founded by the late activist Esther Chavez Cano.
Led by Roman Garcia, the men claimed to be enforcing a legal order by Juarez Valley Judge Guadalupe Manuel de Santiago Aguayo to find and turn over a minor child, Lesly Itzel Munoz Gonzalez, who was involved in a family dispute.
Shelter staff initially refused to allow the men inside, but relented after being verbally threatened and shown a gun. Once inside the building, the men reportedly hit furniture and looked underneath a bed, to the alarm of the women and children present. Not finding Munoz on the premises, the men left.
The incident elicited a sharp protest from women’s rights groups in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City. Signed by the Women’s Human Rights Center and the Women’s Roundtable of Ciudad Juarez, a statement demanded that Chihuahua Governor Jose Reyes Baeza and Chihuahua Supreme Court President Rodolfo Acosta Munoz guarantee the safety of shelter clients, staff and activists.
According to the two groups, the police intrusion left clients- who are already exposed to violence in their lives- in a state of fear. Under the center’s rules, men and guns are not allowed on the property. The activists also demanded the immediate relocation of the shelter to a new site, and the firing of justice system officials responsible for violating the victims’ sanctuary.
Writing about the raids, Cacho contended that the presence of armed men in places where women and children fleeing violence are supposed to be safe and secure was linked to an overall situation of lawlessness and impunity.
“In the three cases the state and municipal police knew there was no authority, and that they could utilize the force of the state for personal vengeance and warn the victims they are not safe anywhere,” Cacho wrote.
Sources: Cimacnoticias, June 14, 2010. Gladis Torres Ruiz. El Universal,
June 14, 2010. Article by Lydia Cacho.
Frontera NorteSur (FNS): on-line, U.S.-Mexico border news
Center for Latin American and Border Studies
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, New Mexico
For a free electronic subscription email: fnsnews@nmsu.edu
In Mexico, not even shelters for victims of domestic violence are safe from trouble. Recently, refuges for battered women and children have been the object of police raids in Monterrey, Cancun and Ciudad Juarez.
In the tourist resort of Cancun, municipal police searching for a woman attempted to enter the Center for the Integral Attention of Women, a shelter directed by well-known women’s rights advocate and journalist Lydia Cacho, late last month. Center staff, however, successfully blocked the armed men from entering the building.
A shelter in Ciudad Juarez wasn’t so lucky. On June 9, a group of 14 men, several of whom were armed with high-powered weapons, showed up at the “Without Violence” safe house founded by the late activist Esther Chavez Cano.
Led by Roman Garcia, the men claimed to be enforcing a legal order by Juarez Valley Judge Guadalupe Manuel de Santiago Aguayo to find and turn over a minor child, Lesly Itzel Munoz Gonzalez, who was involved in a family dispute.
Shelter staff initially refused to allow the men inside, but relented after being verbally threatened and shown a gun. Once inside the building, the men reportedly hit furniture and looked underneath a bed, to the alarm of the women and children present. Not finding Munoz on the premises, the men left.
The incident elicited a sharp protest from women’s rights groups in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua City. Signed by the Women’s Human Rights Center and the Women’s Roundtable of Ciudad Juarez, a statement demanded that Chihuahua Governor Jose Reyes Baeza and Chihuahua Supreme Court President Rodolfo Acosta Munoz guarantee the safety of shelter clients, staff and activists.
According to the two groups, the police intrusion left clients- who are already exposed to violence in their lives- in a state of fear. Under the center’s rules, men and guns are not allowed on the property. The activists also demanded the immediate relocation of the shelter to a new site, and the firing of justice system officials responsible for violating the victims’ sanctuary.
Writing about the raids, Cacho contended that the presence of armed men in places where women and children fleeing violence are supposed to be safe and secure was linked to an overall situation of lawlessness and impunity.
“In the three cases the state and municipal police knew there was no authority, and that they could utilize the force of the state for personal vengeance and warn the victims they are not safe anywhere,” Cacho wrote.
Sources: Cimacnoticias, June 14, 2010. Gladis Torres Ruiz. El Universal,
June 14, 2010. Article by Lydia Cacho.
Frontera NorteSur (FNS): on-line, U.S.-Mexico border news
Center for Latin American and Border Studies
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, New Mexico
For a free electronic subscription email: fnsnews@nmsu.edu
Mexican Government's Alleged Complicity with the Sinaloa Cartel Shows that Money Fuels Drug War Corruption
by Kristin Bricker
This is a much more detailed version of an article that is running on the Security Sector Reform Resournce Centre's blog. It contains a lot more statistics about corruption, and explores more problems and possible solutions to the problem. The thesis is the same: no one wants to look at the finances of drug trafficking, but all anti-corruption strategies are doomed to fail as long as that is the case.
Last month, NPR published new evidence that supports the prevailing theory amongst Mexicans: that the Felipe Calderón administration favors the Sinaloa drug trafficking organization (DTO) in the war on drugs. NPR's report includes testimony from Mexican law enforcement officials, politicians, crime reporters, and residents, as well as former and current US counterintelligence and DEA agents. Nearly all of them were in agreement: the powerful Sinaloa DTO is weathering Mexico's war on drugs far better than its competitors. NPR also analyzed arrest data for over 2,600 suspected members of major DTOs and found that since the war began in 2006, the largest number of defendants (44%) have come from the Sinaloa DTO's arch nemesis, the Gulf-Zetas organization. The Sinaloa DTO, on the other hand, has suffered surprisingly few arrests (12% of the total) given its relative size and power.
In response to the NPR report, the Mexican government claimed that the Sinaloa organization actually comprises 24% of its overall drug arrests, while only 27% are from the Gulf-Zetas. Unlike NPR, the Mexican government did not release its methodology. However, the Mexican government is known for using "fuzzy math" when attempting to justify the drug war. At a recent drug policy reform conference in Mexico City, Luis Astorga from the National Autonomous University of Mexico’s Institute for Social Investigations demonstrated that the Mexican government consistently feeds the press baseless and contradictory drug war statistics. Astorga's presentation questioned the veracity of any drug war statistics issued by the Mexican government that aren't accompanied by "a study and a methodology for how they arrived at those numbers.”
The US government, on the other hand, chose to simply ignore the NPR report. When reporters questioned a senior White House official about NPR's findings, he reaffirmed President Obama's "long-term commitment to Calderon's struggle against the cartels" and side-stepped the question.
The NPR report is particularly disturbing because of the role corruption has played in Mexico's "rigged" drug war. The Mexican government officials, reporters, and residents that NPR interviewed almost unanimously pointed to the Sinaloa cartel's impressive ability to bring police and soldiers onto its payroll.
Mexicans and US officials were well-aware of Mexico's problem even before NPR published its findings: Calderon launched "Operation Clean-up" just as public debate over the Merida Initiative was in full-swing. Operation Clean-up purged allegedly corrupt officials from agencies involved in the war on drugs. At the same time, Calderon launched a Merida Initiative-funded country-wide screening of all police officers. In some locales, half or all of the police were fired following screenings.
The problem with these anti-corruption measures is that they ignore the systematic nature of corruption. Sinaloa Congressman Manuel Clouthier told NPR, "It is like we're trimming the branches of a tree, when we should be tearing it out by the roots."
The massive police purge trims off the corrupt cops without attacking the root of the problem: DTOs have enough money to buy new cops to replace the old ones. Even when the government fires entire police forces--as it has been known to do--the DTOs will buy new police because they have a seemingly endless source of money.
Operation Clean-up, rather than permanently rooting out corrupt officials and agents, highlighted the fact that drug cartel corruption goes up to the highest levels. At least three former Mexican drug tsars are currently in prison; all have been accused of collusion with DTOs.
Operation Clean-up's high-ranking victims didn't surprise many in Mexico, where narcos have infiltrated every part of the government that is relevant to their business--even the President's office. In 2005, the DEA caught former President Vicente Fox's tour coordinator, Nahum Acosta Lugo, using Los Pinos telephones to communicate with the Beltran Leyva organization, which at the time still formed part of the Sinaloa organization. Despite the DEA's taped called between the presidential aide and known drug traffickers, Acosta Lugo spent six days in prison before being freed "for lack of evidence."
Even Raúl Salinas, brother of former President Carlos Salinas, was accused of collaborating with drug kingpins during his brother's administration.
The US government's efforts to establish teams of incorruptible Mexican police that they can trust with sensitive intelligence information have met fierce resistance from DTOs. The US Embassy has recruited meticulously screened Mexican Federal Police to its Sensitive Investigation Units (SIU). These police receive Special Forces training from the FBI and DEA in Washington to prepare them for key involvement in police and intelligence work. However, the frequent polygraph tests that these police must undergo discovered that many of them had been bought by the DTOs. Those who couldn't be bought appear to be prime targets: over a period of a few months in 2008, drug traffickers assassinated at least twelve high-ranking SIU police who worked closely with the US Embassy. In some cases, most notably that of Federal Police chief Edgar Millán, it was apparent that the drug traffickers had corrupted members of the officers' security teams in order to obtain intelligence on their movements.
"It's the Economy, Stupid"
The Calderon adminstration's detention-focused anti-corruption strategy is doomed to fail as long as it ignores the source of DTOs' power: money. The general consensus amongst drug policy experts is that the Mexican government has not done enough to dismantle the DTOs' vast financial networks. The International Monetary Fund, for example, points out that between 1989 and mid-2009, the Mexican government obtained about 32 money laundering convictions.
Edgardo Buscaglia, a professor at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico and an expert in the economics of crime, argues that Mexico hasn't done as much as it could to attack organized crime's financial networks. "I would recommend to the Federal Secretary of Public Security that instead of worrying about having more helicopters that he get to work strengthening investigations in order to dismantle the underworld's finances," Buscaglia told the Mexican daily El Universal. Buscaglia recommends that Mexico fully implement the Palermo Convention, a United Nations convention that includes best practices and legislative guides that aim to enhance international cooperation against transnational organized crime.
Through the Merida Initiative, the United States is providing Mexico with updated technology and training to investigate money laundering, and the two countries will increase intelligence-sharing. However, the US has not taken any noticeable steps to remedy the shortcomings in its own system for identifying and sanctioning organized crime's front businesses. The US' notorious black list, which identifies drug kingpins and their assets, includes over two hundred Mexican businesses that the Treasury Department claims are fronts for drug traffickers. The black list includes business names and locations, but no proof to back up the Treasury Department's claims that they are connected to drug trafficking. As a result, the Mexican government has taken legal action in very few black list cases.
Mexico and the United States' focus on arrests and their relative lack of action against organized crime's financial structures could reflect the governments' own financial interests. Estimates of exactly how much money drugs pump into the Mexican and US economies vary widely, and the methodology for how experts arrived at those numbers is almost never explained. However, one thing is clear: drug trafficking is one of Mexico's most important industries, and through money laundering, it comprises a significant percentage of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP). This is not just the case in Mexico: the United Nations argues that drug money kept the global banking system afloat during the worst of the financial crisis. As banks lost over a trillion dollars in toxic assets and bad loans, "Inter-bank loans were funded by money that originated from the drugs trade and other illegal activities," claims Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. "There were signs that some banks were rescued that way."
The drug war's financial contradictions have led some governments to re-evaluate their prohibitionist policies. Just as in the 1920s when the United States government decided that the prohibition of alcohol contributed to the creation of wealthy mafias, some local governments are asking themselves if they would have more success regulating and taxing marijuana rather than outright prohibiting it.
In January 2009, in the midst of speculation that Mexico's drug war violence would spill over into the US, the El Paso, Texas, City Council unanimously voted to initiate a debate over the decriminalization of some drugs.
In 2009, four former presidents of Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil called for legalizing marijuana. "The focus on prohibition has generated serious human and social problems as violence and corruption increase in the region,” said former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso. “A realistic evaluation of these policies shows that there has been no reduction in production nor in the consumption of drugs. We are farther than ever from the announced goal of eradicating illicit drugs.” Calderon's two immediate predecessors, Ernesto Zedillo and fellow party member Vicente Fox, joined the call for legalization.
California might put the former presidents' advice into practice: this coming November, voters will decide on a referendum that, if passed, will legalize the possession of up to one ounce of marijuana for personal use. The chairwoman of California's State Board of Equity, Betty Yee, estimates that taxing marijuana consumption could bring in an additional $1.3 billion per year in taxes for her state. With his state facing critical budget shortfalls, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger told the press, "I think it's time for a debate. I think of all those ideas of creating extra revenues, I'm always open for a debate on it." Legalizing marijuana would reduce the burden on California's overflowing prison system, and at the same time would bring in extra revenue in taxes.
California's legalization move would arguably shift production for that state's consumers almost entirely into California. This would cut into Mexican DTOs' profits, who reportedly derive between 50-65% of their profits from marijuana.
Tuesday, June 8, 2010
San Juan Copala Aid Caravan Enters the Danger Zone
Update 5:52pm: The caravan did not make it to Copala because of the danger. It has turned around and is heading back to Huajuapan.
A second international aid caravan is on its way to San Juan Copala in the Triqui region of Oaxaca, Mexico. The caravan has entered an area without telephone service, severely limiting communication. The lack of communication puts the caravan in grave danger of a paramilitary attack.
Paramilitaries ambushed the first aid caravan on April 27, killing Mexican Bety Cariño and Finnish international observer Jyri Jaakkola. As a result, the aid caravan could not reach its destination.
The new caravan, which is currently en route to San Juan Copala, is comprised of eight buses. The caravan is reportedly carrying 40 tons of aid for the municipality, which has been under constant paramilitary siege for the past seven months. Caravan participants report that people in communities along the route to Copala are lining the streets to cheer on the caravan.
Overt Government Collaboration With Paramilitaries?
The Oaxacan state government attempted to physically impede the caravan on two occasions today. Once, in Juxtlahuaca, state police physically blocked the entrance to the town so that the caravan could not pass. Caravan members began to get off the buses and continue on foot, leading the police to move their vehicles and let the buses pass.
While police blocked the entrance to Juxtlahuaca, Oaxaca state Attorney General Candelaria Chiñas reportedly approached the caravan and demanded to negotiate with Alejandro Encinas, the leader of the center-left Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). Encinas is accompanying the caravan as a participant and is not in a position to negotiate on behalf of the caravan nor the autonomous municipality. The caravan participants' determination to reach San Juan Copala, even if it had to be on foot, successfully pressured the government to lift the police blockade and allow the community to proceed on to Santa Rosa.
In Santa Rosa, the state government once again attempted to stop the caravan. There, Chiñas demanded that the paramilitary organization UBISORT be permitted to join the caravan. Chiñas' party, the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI), founded the UBISORT and reportedly maintains close ties with the armed organization. Authorities from the autonomous municipality refused to allow the paramilitaries to join the caravan.
The caravan is now headed for Agua Fría. From this point on, the caravan is out of telephone range. This puts the caravan in considerable danger.
Oaxaca City-based Radio Plantón has speculated that the state government's stall tactics are playing into the paramilitaries' hands. The government stalled the caravan for hours, meaning that if the caravan does reach San Juan Copala, it would have to spend the night there or run the risk of returning after nightfall.
There are reports that UBISORT has sent women and children to re-enforce its physical blockade of the highway into San Juan Copala. Over the weekend, someone re-enforced the blockade with much heavier rocks that can only be removed with heavy machinery.
As the caravan travels in the telephone dead zone, there are protests in Mexico and around the world demanding that the government guarantee the caravan's safe passage to San Juan Copala so that it can deliver its aid. In Oaxaca City, supporters have blocked Cinco Señores, a key intersection, in support of the caravan. A march in Mexico City was attacked by riot police, reportedly leaving several protesters injured. In Buenos Aires, protesters have set up a protest encampment outside the Mexican Embassy. They are dialoguing with embassy officials.
Background
San Juan Copala declared itself autonomous following the peaceful uprising in 2006 that nearly overthrew Oaxaca's governor. The paramilitary organization UBISORT, which the ruling Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) created in 1994 to counter potential Zapatista influence in the indigenous Triqui region, has violently opposed the autonomous project. In January, UBISORT blocked the road into San Juan Copala, preventing supplies and teachers from entering the municipality. UBISORT also cut the running water and electricity to San Juan Copala. The months-long siege means that San Juan Copala is running out of food.
At least 18 Triquis have been assassinated in the region this year.
A second international aid caravan is on its way to San Juan Copala in the Triqui region of Oaxaca, Mexico. The caravan has entered an area without telephone service, severely limiting communication. The lack of communication puts the caravan in grave danger of a paramilitary attack.
Paramilitaries ambushed the first aid caravan on April 27, killing Mexican Bety Cariño and Finnish international observer Jyri Jaakkola. As a result, the aid caravan could not reach its destination.
The new caravan, which is currently en route to San Juan Copala, is comprised of eight buses. The caravan is reportedly carrying 40 tons of aid for the municipality, which has been under constant paramilitary siege for the past seven months. Caravan participants report that people in communities along the route to Copala are lining the streets to cheer on the caravan.
Overt Government Collaboration With Paramilitaries?
The Oaxacan state government attempted to physically impede the caravan on two occasions today. Once, in Juxtlahuaca, state police physically blocked the entrance to the town so that the caravan could not pass. Caravan members began to get off the buses and continue on foot, leading the police to move their vehicles and let the buses pass.
While police blocked the entrance to Juxtlahuaca, Oaxaca state Attorney General Candelaria Chiñas reportedly approached the caravan and demanded to negotiate with Alejandro Encinas, the leader of the center-left Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). Encinas is accompanying the caravan as a participant and is not in a position to negotiate on behalf of the caravan nor the autonomous municipality. The caravan participants' determination to reach San Juan Copala, even if it had to be on foot, successfully pressured the government to lift the police blockade and allow the community to proceed on to Santa Rosa.
In Santa Rosa, the state government once again attempted to stop the caravan. There, Chiñas demanded that the paramilitary organization UBISORT be permitted to join the caravan. Chiñas' party, the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI), founded the UBISORT and reportedly maintains close ties with the armed organization. Authorities from the autonomous municipality refused to allow the paramilitaries to join the caravan.
The caravan is now headed for Agua Fría. From this point on, the caravan is out of telephone range. This puts the caravan in considerable danger.
Oaxaca City-based Radio Plantón has speculated that the state government's stall tactics are playing into the paramilitaries' hands. The government stalled the caravan for hours, meaning that if the caravan does reach San Juan Copala, it would have to spend the night there or run the risk of returning after nightfall.
There are reports that UBISORT has sent women and children to re-enforce its physical blockade of the highway into San Juan Copala. Over the weekend, someone re-enforced the blockade with much heavier rocks that can only be removed with heavy machinery.
As the caravan travels in the telephone dead zone, there are protests in Mexico and around the world demanding that the government guarantee the caravan's safe passage to San Juan Copala so that it can deliver its aid. In Oaxaca City, supporters have blocked Cinco Señores, a key intersection, in support of the caravan. A march in Mexico City was attacked by riot police, reportedly leaving several protesters injured. In Buenos Aires, protesters have set up a protest encampment outside the Mexican Embassy. They are dialoguing with embassy officials.
Background
San Juan Copala declared itself autonomous following the peaceful uprising in 2006 that nearly overthrew Oaxaca's governor. The paramilitary organization UBISORT, which the ruling Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) created in 1994 to counter potential Zapatista influence in the indigenous Triqui region, has violently opposed the autonomous project. In January, UBISORT blocked the road into San Juan Copala, preventing supplies and teachers from entering the municipality. UBISORT also cut the running water and electricity to San Juan Copala. The months-long siege means that San Juan Copala is running out of food.
At least 18 Triquis have been assassinated in the region this year.
All Eyes on San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, As Second Aid Caravan Begins
June 8, 2010 - The world will be closely watching the autonomous municipality of San Juan Copala, Oaxaca, as a second international aid caravan attempts to break the paramilitary blockade that has kept that community cut off from the outside world since January.
The Union for the Social Well-being of the Triqui Region (UBISORT), an armed organization that was founded by and maintains close ties with the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI, the party that has ruled the state of Oaxaca with an iron fist for the past eighty years) blocked the road into San Juan Copala in January. The group also cut running water and electricity to the community. The presence of sharpshooters in the surrounding hillsides and mountains makes it virtually impossible for San Juan Copala residents to leave their homes during the day.
This past April 27, self-identified members of UBISORT opened fire on an international aid caravan headed for San Juan Copala, according to survivors. Two people died in the ambush.
Even though the ambush on that caravan attracted international attention and condemnation, the security situation in San Juan Copala appears to be steadily deteriorating. On May 16, twelve indigenous Triqui women and children were kidnapped by people whom they identify as UBISORT leaders and members. Their captors released them a day later after destroying all of their belongings.
Then, on May 20, mestizo hitmen murdered Timoteo Alejandro Ramírez and Cleriberta Castro in their home in the Yosoyuxi community, which is part of the autonomous municipality. Ramírez was one of the founders of the autonomous municipality and one of its most important leaders.
On June 4, just days before the caravan is scheduled to take place, the blockade outside San Juan Copala was reinforced with "large rocks" which the Oaxaca-based Bartolomé Carrasco Briseño Human Rights Center says it presumes "were placed there with heavy machinery."
On June 5 and 6, an armed group opened fire on San Juan Copala, injuring 20-year-old Melitón Rodríguez Martínez, reportedly as he left his home in an attempt to reach his bathroom, which is not connected to his house. He received 3-4 gunshots in the leg, according to Father Wilfrido Mayén Peláez. The Bartolomé Carrasco Briseño Human Rights Center reports that Rodríguez Martínez has not yet received medical attention because residents have been unable to transport him out of the community to a medical center.
The new caravan, scheduled to arrive in San Juan Copala the morning of June 8, is considerably larger and higher-profile than the April 27 caravan, which only had about 30 participants. The June 8 caravan is comprised of two contingents: seven buses and trucks that left Mexico City the night of June 7, and one bus from Oaxaca City. In all, over 200 people are expected to participate in the caravan, and they are bringing a three-ton truck full of aid for San Juan Copala residents. Over a dozen federal members of Congress are expected to accompany the caravan.
The Oaxaca state government has provided no guarantees for the caravan. It has reportedly deployed between 150-350 state police along the route to San Juan Copala. It demanded that caravan organizers provide the government with the names and personal information of all of the caravan organizers and participants, along with the immigration statuses of foreigners. It also requested a complete itinerary for the caravan. Caravan organizers say they will not turn that information over to the government for security reasons.
For its part, UBISORT has warned the caravan to cancel the June 8 trip, because it says "the conditions don't exist." It said the same thing just prior to the first caravan, which its members allegedly ambushed.
The municipality of San Juan Copala declared itself autonomous following the nonviolent uprising that nearly overthrew the Oaxacan governor in 2006. Since then, it has suffered violence at the hands political organizations in the area, such as UBISORT, which are allied with the government. The crisis intensified seven months ago, when UBISORT paramilitaries blockaded the community. Shootouts and murders are now a common occurrence in the Triqui region.
The Union for the Social Well-being of the Triqui Region (UBISORT), an armed organization that was founded by and maintains close ties with the Institutional Revolution Party (PRI, the party that has ruled the state of Oaxaca with an iron fist for the past eighty years) blocked the road into San Juan Copala in January. The group also cut running water and electricity to the community. The presence of sharpshooters in the surrounding hillsides and mountains makes it virtually impossible for San Juan Copala residents to leave their homes during the day.
This past April 27, self-identified members of UBISORT opened fire on an international aid caravan headed for San Juan Copala, according to survivors. Two people died in the ambush.
Even though the ambush on that caravan attracted international attention and condemnation, the security situation in San Juan Copala appears to be steadily deteriorating. On May 16, twelve indigenous Triqui women and children were kidnapped by people whom they identify as UBISORT leaders and members. Their captors released them a day later after destroying all of their belongings.
Then, on May 20, mestizo hitmen murdered Timoteo Alejandro Ramírez and Cleriberta Castro in their home in the Yosoyuxi community, which is part of the autonomous municipality. Ramírez was one of the founders of the autonomous municipality and one of its most important leaders.
On June 4, just days before the caravan is scheduled to take place, the blockade outside San Juan Copala was reinforced with "large rocks" which the Oaxaca-based Bartolomé Carrasco Briseño Human Rights Center says it presumes "were placed there with heavy machinery."
On June 5 and 6, an armed group opened fire on San Juan Copala, injuring 20-year-old Melitón Rodríguez Martínez, reportedly as he left his home in an attempt to reach his bathroom, which is not connected to his house. He received 3-4 gunshots in the leg, according to Father Wilfrido Mayén Peláez. The Bartolomé Carrasco Briseño Human Rights Center reports that Rodríguez Martínez has not yet received medical attention because residents have been unable to transport him out of the community to a medical center.
The new caravan, scheduled to arrive in San Juan Copala the morning of June 8, is considerably larger and higher-profile than the April 27 caravan, which only had about 30 participants. The June 8 caravan is comprised of two contingents: seven buses and trucks that left Mexico City the night of June 7, and one bus from Oaxaca City. In all, over 200 people are expected to participate in the caravan, and they are bringing a three-ton truck full of aid for San Juan Copala residents. Over a dozen federal members of Congress are expected to accompany the caravan.
The Oaxaca state government has provided no guarantees for the caravan. It has reportedly deployed between 150-350 state police along the route to San Juan Copala. It demanded that caravan organizers provide the government with the names and personal information of all of the caravan organizers and participants, along with the immigration statuses of foreigners. It also requested a complete itinerary for the caravan. Caravan organizers say they will not turn that information over to the government for security reasons.
For its part, UBISORT has warned the caravan to cancel the June 8 trip, because it says "the conditions don't exist." It said the same thing just prior to the first caravan, which its members allegedly ambushed.
The municipality of San Juan Copala declared itself autonomous following the nonviolent uprising that nearly overthrew the Oaxacan governor in 2006. Since then, it has suffered violence at the hands political organizations in the area, such as UBISORT, which are allied with the government. The crisis intensified seven months ago, when UBISORT paramilitaries blockaded the community. Shootouts and murders are now a common occurrence in the Triqui region.
Posts
