Wednesday, November 5, 2008

Mexican Interior Minister Juan Camilo Mouriño and Top Drug Prosecutor José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos Die in Plane Crash

Interior Minister Juan Camilo Mouriño and drug prosecutor José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos died along with twelve other people when the plane carrying the government officials crashed into Mexico City's financial district last night.

Juan Camilo Mouriño had been at the center of numerous energy scandals. He was Felipe Calderon's right-hand man and climbed the political ladder on the current president's coattails. As Interior Minister he was the most powerful member of Calderon's cabinet.

José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos had received numerous death threats and survived two attempts on his life as a result of his work combatting drug cartels.

While Mexico's Secretary of Transportation has said that all signs point to the crash being an accident and not an attack on the officials, President Calderon has yet to use the word "accident" in his public communications regarding the crash. The black box recovered from the crash site indicates that the pilots never issued an SOS or reported any emergency or technical problems prior to crashing. Calderon has promised a thorough investigation that will involve US and British experts.

The following is an obituary written by one of Mexico's top drug reporters for José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos, one of Mexico's leading drug prosecutors.

Vasconcelos, amongst threats and scandals

by Ricardo Ravelo, Proceso
translation and notes by Kristin Bricker

Mexico City, November 4. After a long career combatting drug trafficking in the Federal Attorney General's office (PGR in its Spanish initials), José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos died tonight, along with the Interior Minister, Juan Camilo Mouriño, and six other people, when the aircraft that was carrying them crashed in Mexico City's western zone, very close to the president's official residence, Los Pinos.

Just this past September, after 20 years of service in the PGR, Vasconcelos resigned from the Assistant Prosecutor's Judicial and International Affairs office, where he had worked since the beginning of President Calderon's term.

Before, and over the decades, Vasconcelos served as head of the Specialized Unit on Organized Crime, an office which was later elevated to the rank of assistant prosecutor's office [translator's note: the Specialized Unit on Organized Crime became the Assistant Attorney General's Office for Specialized Investigation of Organized Crime, or SIEDO in its Spanish initials, which was recently rocked by the revelation that some of its top-ranking officials were on the Beltran Leyva cartel's payroll].

After a scandal provoked in a Cabinet meeting in which the federal Secretary of Public Security, Genaro Garcia Luna, and the Federal Attorney General, Eduardo Medina Mora, became immersed in a heated discussion, problems arose within the PGR, particularly in the SIEDO.

Noe Ramirez Mandujano resigned from the SIEDO, and Vasconcelos followed him soon thereafter, making the following argument: "I decided to step aside to let some fresh blood and new energy enter the PGR.

"When I was informed that the federal Attorney General, Eduardo Medina Mora, had plans to renovate the institution and integrate people from his team into the fight against crime, I put tendered my resignation in order to continue the effort to combat crime from other security departments within the federal government."

During his time in the PGR--he began working there at the beginning of Carlos Salinas de Gortari's adminstration, when the attorney general was Enrique Alvarez del Castillo--Vasconcelos was a key figure in combatting drug trafficking: amongst other detentions, he is credited with the investigations that resulted in the detention of Osiel Cardenas Guillen [the imprisoned head of the Gulf cartel].

Before that, Vasconcelos collaborated on investigations in the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes against Health (Feads in its Spanish initials) in order to detain Juan Garcia Abrego [former head of the Gulf cartel]. He also went after Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the so-caled "Lord of the Skies," the boss of the Juarez cartel.

He combatted Los Zetas, the armed wing of the Gulf cartel; various members of the Gulf cartel itself, amongst them Eduardo "El Coss" Costilla [alleged leader of the Gulf cartel]; as well as the Beltran Leyva organization.

It was said that [the Beltran Leyva organization] had threatened to kill Vasconcelos, that hitmen for these men frequently followed him, and that--according to the information the Secretary of Public Security could gather--it had something to do with gunmen hired by that criminal organization.

This past January, the official was saved from two attempts on his life allegedly perpetrated by Arturo Beltran Leyva's hitmen. The capital police thwarted both attacks by chance. The hitmen were detained in the capital before carrying out the operation.

Following Vasconcelos' resignation from the PGR, President Felipe Calderon designated him as the coordinator to carry out legal reforms with the goal of strengthening the country's legal framework against drug trafficking.

Following Vasconcelos' departure from the PGR, the SIEDO-- was slammed by a corruption crisis within the department. SIEDO is currently run by Marisela Morales, a person who is close to the ex-attorney general Rafael Macedo de la Concha. The crisis had to do with about 40 officials--some of them Vasconcelos' colleagues in the SIEDO--who leaked information to the Beltran Leyva brothers, who are clashing with Calderon's government.

Parallel to these events, a corruption crisis also hit the Secretary of Public Security, lead by Genaro Garcia Luna, a person who in various PGR investigations--amongst others, PGR/SIEDO/UEIDCS/106/2005*--has been associated with the Beltran Leyva brothers.


* PGR/SIEDO/UEIDCS/106/2005 is a case in which four alleged members of Los Zetas were kidnapped and tortured, and one of the was executed. The assailants appeared to be Federal Investigation Agency [AFI] agents who operated under the protection of two PGR agents.

Tuesday, November 4, 2008

The Battle for Pemex: a Mexican Oil Worker Explains Energy Reform

Mexican Congress approves light reforms for the state oil company; legislators vow to continue the campaign to privatize Pemex
by Kristin Bricker
Mexican Congress approved light reforms to the state-owned oil monopoly Pemex at the end of October 2008. While the details of the reforms have still not been published in the government’s Official Diary of the Federation, details are trickling out through the media.
The biggest reform reported so far assigns specific blocks of the Gulf of Mexico to private companies to drill and explore. Private companies have been allowed to explore and drill in the Gulf of Mexico for years, but this is the first time they’ll have exclusive rights to specific blocks. This was one of the more contentious parts of the new laws, with opposition leader Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador calling for language specifically barring the government from assigning exclusive blocks to private companies. He sees this practice as an initial step towards further privatization of Mexico’s oil industry. However, Energy Secretary Georgina Kessel argued, "If we're drilling a well in one particular area, we can't allow somebody else to come along and do drilling in the same area."

Other significant reforms are the addition of 4 independent members to the company's board of directors and bonuses for companies that finish projects ahead of schedule or pass on technology to Pemex.

The reforms provoked tepid responses from the international private petroleum industry, which was hoping for sweeping changes to Mexico’s energy sector.

The new laws are a minor setback for President Felipe Calderon and his National Action Party (PAN), which called for the privatization of Pemex in April. Calderon wanted to allow private companies to build and own refineries and transport oil. The Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) supported the PAN's efforts but refused to call the proposed reform "privatization" during an election season.

Despite the setback, lawmakers vow to continue the campaign to privatize Pemex, which would require constitutional changes. Sen. Carlos Lozano of the PRI told Reuters, "Constitutional changes are not on our agenda right now. It is a three-year agenda."

The business community seems to agree that while the new laws don’t change much, the fight to privatize Pemex is not over. "What they've passed is just an affirmation of the status quo," said energy analyst George Baker. "They're a place-holder for real market-oriented reforms."

The one thing the entire country agrees upon is that Pemex is in dire need of reform; the question is what kind of reform. Pemex's infrastructure is on average 25 years old. Pemex's refining capacity is severely insufficient. Overall production has fallen at least 10% over the past year.

Laura Carlsen of the Center for International Policy's Americas Program argues that government officials have sabotaged Pemex in order to pave the way for privatization:
Ironically the politicians calling for handing over refining and other Pemex operations to foreign companies are the same ones responsible at least in part for the company's current incapacity.... [M]uch of the deterioration of Pemex occurred under the watch of the same political party that now argues that the only way to save the company is to contract out to the private sector. Calderon served as Secretary of Energy in the Fox administration from 2003-2004. PAN governments have held power for nearly eight years, during which time Pemex had record sales due to high international oil prices. Why wasn't that money reinvested in the oil company to avoid the current crisis?
The bleeding of Pemex was a conscious administrative and political decision, for two reasons. First, the funds siphoned out of the petroleum behemoth masked the real state of the Mexican economy. The Treasury Ministry used Pemex income, and especially the windfall profits of the past few years that are not earmarked in the congressionally approved budget, as a petty cash box. Much of this money went to pay off foreign debt. Some of it disappeared into corruption such as the "Pemexgate" case that diverted funds to support the PRI presidential candidacy. And much of the rest ended up in presidential pet projects. Successive administrations bled Pemex for political aims and with little or no accountability to Congress or the Mexican people.
Second, neoliberal administrators intentionally sought to create a dismal outlook for the state-owned enterprise to strengthen their difficult case for privatization. Only by presenting a doomsday scenario could they hope to pass the key legislative reforms regarding the oil industry that would finally fulfill the objectives for structural reform envisioned by the World Bank, the U.S. government, and Mexico's neoliberal leaders.
The battle for Pemex is far from over. Energy is a central component of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), which is led by a group of thirty corporations—including Chevron Texaco, Sunoco, and ExxonMobil. The SPP calls for North American energy integration. Other corporations behind the SPP include several transport companies who have undoubtedly been salivating over the prospect of opening oil transport in Mexico to the private sector through Calderon's energy reform.
These corporate and neoliberal actors will not let up their pressure to privatize Mexico's oil, and neither will conservative forces in Mexico. The political parties' rhetoric about energy reform has been intentionally confusing as different actors clamor for financial and political benefits. Just before Mexican Congress considered the new reforms, journalist Kristin Bricker sat down with Eduardo Gomezcaña Morales, former Pemex worker and current economist for the National Union of Trustworthy Petroleum Industry Workers, a Pemex workers' union, to understand what is really at stake in the continuing debate over the future of Mexico's oil reserves.

Bricker: Can you explain PEMEX's current situation? What parts of Mexico’s petroleum industry have already been privatized and what's still public domain?
 

Gomezcaña Morales: There's been a lot of debate over what exactly is "privatization." So let's look at a dictionary. Privatization is converting something that used to be monopolized by the government—what we know as "public"—into a private entity.

Since 1974, they've been going about privatizing some substantive parts of the petroleum industry. In that year Mexico began to export crude oil. Before 1974 Mexico produced petroleum for domestic benefit, for domestic consumption. Because the United States was no longer receiving petroleum from the Arabs, and because US oil production peaked in 1970, the United States thought it necessary to bully the small countries, the underdeveloped countries, countries in the Global South, with the goal of attracting petroleum and the production of that product. So, in 1974 Mexico began overproducing petroleum in order to sell it to the United States. With strategic and financial objectives, this set off the process of privatization.

In subsequent years came the process of privatizing substantive activities like petrochemicals. Petrochemicals were the spearhead for privatization.

Beginning with [former president] Carlos Salinas de Gotari, the neoliberal governments broke down the classification of petrochemicals into primary and secondary products, which is a degradation because these classifications don't exist in reality. So with this new classification, in 1985 sixteen petrochemicals were classified as secondaries with the objective of evading the Mexican Constitution. The Constitution said that the State was responsible for regulating the primary products derived from petroleum. So they converted them into secondary products so that private interests could begin to produce them. The next year they reclassified 32 more as secondaries.

This caused a resistance movement in the 1980’s that managed to halt this process, and they returned the petrochemical-producing activities to Pemex, but without any restructuring. They bought a couple of refineries which are now obsolete, and others which still haven't been used to date. They remained intact after they were installed. They haven't maintained them, they haven't monitored them—they haven't even used them. So what the neoliberal government did was [through neglect] provoke a situation in which Mexico was converted into a country which imports petrochemicals [due to a lack of refining capacity].

After this came the process of the privatization of natural gas. During the first phase, gas was classified by Pemex as a basic [or primary] petrochemical. The transportation of gas through pipelines was granted to private companies. As oil workers all over the world know, pipelines require rigorous protection. For example, they require maintenance, they require pigging [specialized inspection and removal of residue from the interior of the pipeline]—activities which the private companies who received the concessions are not doing. So these companies charge for delivering the product, but they don't maintain the pipelines. Because Pemex maintains the other pipelines that accompany the natural gas pipelines, we have to maintain the natural gas pipelines, too. So really it's a gift to the private companies.

Next comes the concession of the right to supply homes with natural gas to French and Spanish companies, first in Mexico City and then in other cities like Guadalajara and Monterey, and they're gradually moving on to others.

So in this way they went about modifying Article 27 of the constitution so that private companies could market natural gas. But administrations like [former President Vicente] Fox's are more cynical. They began to create activities that transnational companies could carry out. So now we're not just talking about Mexican private companies, but also international ones. In 2000 Fox launched public bidding for the exploration, production, and marketing of the country's natural gas, specifically in the Burgos Basin. In the Burgos Basin case we've brought suit against Repsol and the other four contractors involved, because this is clearly privatization. They want to fool the nation and the world by saying that this is not a case of production, but they're the ones who take the gas out of the ground. They don't call it "production;" they call it "development." They're the ones who are marketing the gas. There's a contract that was just publicly announced where Repsol wants to sell natural gas from our Burgos Basin to Peru.

So it's pretty obvious that the process of privatizing the petroleum industry has been going on for a while now. Now Calderon is following this pattern. Calderon is promoting privatization in order to justify all of the irregularities that previous administrations committed, in order to legalize this whole process that I've discussed, in order to erase the wrongdoing. But [the privatization] is already done.
On the labor front, Calderon is also trying to lay off 30,000 workers with a project he's launching that's just coming to light now called the SUMA Project[1]. Right now we're a workforce of 140,000 petroleum workers.

Bricker: Can you explain the center-left Democratic Revolution Party's role in the debate?

Gomezcaña Morales: The problem in our country is that the PAN and the PRI (which controlled the country before the PAN) have a majority in the Chamber of Deputies [Mexico's lower house]. So we're depending on the PRI to accept or not accept Calderon's proposal.

The PRD [Democratic Revolution Party] has a nationalist proposal. There's a big problem within the party right now. The PRD is very divided. Because it wants to co-opt the government, there was a fear that the PRD members of congress would vote for privatization.

Within the PRD there is a nationalist block. The PRD's Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador is the leader of the movement to defend the petroleum industry. Independent of the political bubble that Lopez Obrador is operating out of, he's the only one who's had the good sense to lead a social movement—which is the strongest social movement in our country—in defense of the nationalization of petroleum.

He's doing this in the margins of the PRD. The PRD supposedly has a project together with the FAP [Broad Progressive Front, a coalition of center-left parties], but Lopez Obrador is out there on his own, with the followers he has. But it's the only resistance there is right now.

Lopez Obrador has a good proposal, but it's really his proposal, and not the PRD's. The PRD's proposal together with the rest of the FAP parties—Convergencia and the Worker's Party—isn’t as good as Lopez Obrador's. We support Lopez Obrador's proposal as the only form of defense. The Mexican people support that proposal, and we're hoping it can stop the privatization.

We collaborated on Lopez Obrador's proposal. Even though we're not affiliated with a political party, we did send them a couple of proposals. The proposal is that everything belongs to the state, and that the industry be divided up into strategic areas, and not into service areas or potentially marketable areas. Energy should be what guarantees our country's development. Energy should be part of a national strategic purpose. We don't have to treat it like a resource we can sell. It's a resource for our own nation.

In all of the proposals that have been made, they discuss primary production, exploration, and marketing. All of the proposals are along those lines. There's no need for private companies to get involved in those areas. There's nothing in those about bringing petrochemicals back under national domain, that there be resources for exploration, that maintenance has a sufficient budget so that it can actually be carried out, that refining be increased...

There's a trick going on in our country. The government is using television to make a strong attack. Their ads say, "We want refineries." We do, too! They're appropriating our strategies and slogans, using the same words we use. We want refineries, but we want Mexican refineries. We don't want another Telcel[2]. We don't want Mexico to get sacked again.

If we observe the gas stations that are in Guatemala, El Salvador, and in Honduras, they don't have the minimum security standards that we have in our gas stations in Mexico. And why is that? Because this resource is under the State's control here.

Some of the security standards that we have that don’t exist in Central American countries are, for example, gas pump vapor recovery systems which recover gas vapors so that they don’t pollute the air. This system does not exist anywhere in Central America. The distance between the tank where the gas is stored in the station and the pump is very far. This leads to pollution. In Central America they also don’t have concrete or metal posts to protect the pump if a car loses control and crashes into the station. There’s gas all over the ground in all the gas stations there; in Mexico they get fined if they leave gas on the ground. They’re security measures that they’re not taking. Why? Because Texaco doesn’t let them, Shell doesn’t let them, because Exxon doesn’t let them. All of these companies operate in the margins of the law in these countries. They’re companies that have the power of transnationals, the power of the United States, the power of the great super powers. Given the circumstances, we wouldn’t be able to force them to abide by our laws.

Bricker: How is the privatization of Pemex linked to Plan Puebla Panama, now known as the Mesoamerica Project, and US hegemony?

Gomezcaña Morales: I think Mexico is a laboratory. It’s a neoliberal strategy that goes beyond Plan Puebla Panama, aka the Mesoamerica Project. Mexico isn’t just Puebla and what’s south of that state. In all of the Mexican states there’s privatization, which they want to use as an example for what they’re going to apply in the rest of the world. If they manage to advance in the area of petrochemicals here in Mexico then they’re going to be able to advance petrochemical projects in Costa Rica[3]. If they manage to privatize the refineries in Mexico, then they’re going to be able to start the process of privatizing Costa Rica’s refinery. It’s every clear that they’re carrying out experiments.

In the United States there’s a refinery called Deer Park. Pemex supposedly has a 50-50 stake in the refinery along with Shell Oil. According the Pemex annual reports, to date we haven’t received a single dollar, not a single Mexican cent, for this investment.

I imagine that if Shell were to come to Mexico to build refineries, that Mexico would hand over our petroleum to Shell in our very own country, and that it would sell us the finished product at a very high price, at a price on par with the international market.

This is the experiment that they want to apply all over Latin America. This is why Fox insisted so hard on investing in a refinery in Costa Rica, because it’s part of Plan Puebla Panama. They want to be able to replicate experiments like that all over.

Bricker: How do you respond to politicians’ statements in the media that Mexico is running out of petroleum, so Pemex needs to be privatized before this happens?

Gomezcaña Morales: Peak oil is a reality. Peak oil is petroleum’s downfall. This year we’ve hit peak oil at a global level—we’ve reached the zenith, and now comes the drop in petroleum reserves. We’re seeing this in Mexico. Mexico will stop producing petroleum. We’re not finding new oilfields. We’re already experiencing a strong decrease in petroleum reserves globally.

The problem is that there aren’t alternative projects. The few projects that exist that are searching for alternative energy sources are redundant. Foreigners are carrying out these projects. It’s written into Plan Puebla Panama that in the case of Mexico's wind power, instead of the [state-owned] electric company[4] having the responsibility to invest in wind power projects, they grant the right to install windmills in this zone to foreign private companies like Spain’s Repsol. It’s our wind, even though that sounds a little abstract. The profits won’t be for Mexico. The profits are for the foreign companies. Repsol doesn’t even have the infrastructure to carry out these types of projects. Repsol subcontracts the work to other foreign companies, just like Halliburton does. And they keep granting these projects to Repsol and Halliburton because the neoliberal governments—like Mexico’s—allow it.

Something else very important is going on in Mexico. No other country would permit the conflict of interests that exists in the Mexican Ministry of the Interior (Segob in its Spanish initials). Felipe Calderon’s little pet Juan Camilo Mouriño [the current Secretary of the Interior] has a conflict of interest in our country’s energy sector.[5] He’s Spanish. So he’s promoting Spanish investment in our country. They have vested interests here.

To sum it up, there are two completely different projects here: the Global South’s project and the North’s project. Those of us from below, and the powerful. Those of us who defend all of our resources—one of them being petroleum—from projects like Plan Puebla Panama, and those who want what’s ours.

Footnotes:

[1] Project SUMA is a plan hatched by the United States and Mexico to “synergize” Pemex’s operations. The National Union of At-Will Petroleum Industry Workers says it would lay off workers and reduce Pemex to a company that merely manages contracts and investment portfolios in the Mexican petroleum industry. It would also do away with Pemex’s Corporate Office for Engineering and Project Development, ostensibly to hand over control of project engineering and development to the private sector. The union estimates that between 30,000 and 60,000 workers would be laid off under the project.
[2] When the Mexican government privatized the national telephone company, Telmex, it sold the monopoly to Carlos Slim, who, thanks to the benefits he received from privatization, went on to become the richest man in the world.
[3] Costa Rica also has a state-owned oil company, Recope.
[4] Electricity is also nationalized in Mexico under the government’s Federal Electricity Commission (CFE in its Spanish initials).
[5] In 2002 and 20003, while working as an aid to then-Secretary of Energy Felipe Calderon, Mouriño signed at least three energy contracts as an official representative of his father’s Mexican transportation company Transportes Especializados Ivancar. The contracts were for services provided to Pemex. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who presented the contracts to the media, said, “He obtained million-peso contracts by directly awarding them in order to benefit his family business.”

The War Next Door

As drug cartels battle the government, Mexico descends into chaos

by GUY LAWSON

Rolling Stone, Issue 1065

The dead policeman is found propped against a tree off a dirt road on the outskirts of the city. He is dressed like a cartoon version of a Mexican cowboy, wearing a sombrero and wrapped in a heavy woolen blanket. The murder and symbolic mutilation of policía has become almost routine in Culiacán, capital of the Mexican state of Sinaloa: Pablo Aispuro Ramírez is one of 90 cops to be killed here this year. There is a note pinned to the body, a warning to anyone who dares to oppose the powerful drug lord who ordered the execution.

"I'm a cop-cowboy!" the note reads. "Ahoo-ya! There are going to be more soon!"

In the United States, the War on Drugs is a political slogan for a policy disaster that has cost taxpayers at least $500 billion over the past 35 years. In Mexico, it is a brutal and bewildering conflict — a multisided civil war that has taken 3,000 lives this year alone and brought the federal government to a state of near-collapse. Narcotics are now one of the largest sectors of the Mexican economy, twice the size of tourism. Most of the country's drug trade involves transporting contraband from other sources — especially cocaine from Colombia — to satisfy the nearly insatiable demand in the U.S. But Mexico's narcotraficante cartels have also gotten into the production side of the industry, manufacturing 80 percent of the crystal meth sold in America, 14 percent of the heroin and most of the marijuana. What Mexico offers the global narcotics industry is proximity to the largest market on earth.

Until the Bush administration's crackdown on coca growers in Colombia began driving the drug trade further north, traffic through Mexico was relatively stable, overseen chiefly by the huge cartels based in Sinaloa. Known as "the federation," the traditional families that led Mexico's thriving narcotics business each controlled disparate areas of the U.S. border, much as the Mafia once divided up the boroughs of New York City. Perhaps the most ingenious and hardworking of these Mexican mobsters is Joaquín Guzmán Loera, better known as "El Chapo," or "Shorty." Chapo, who controls the border towns of Nogales and Mexicali, built massive underground tunnels to smuggle cocaine into Arizona. He concealed tons of cocaine in cans of chili peppers destined for California. He assembled a fleet of boats and trucks and airplanes with hidden compartments to enable them to slip past customs. To the U.S. government, he is one of the most wanted drug dealers in the world, a fugitive with a $5 million reward on his head. In Culiacán, he is more folk hero — part Pablo Escobar, part Robin Hood, part Billy the Kid.

"We respect him," the owner of a restaurant in the town of Altata tells me. "He grew up poor, planting corn and pot. Then he took trucks with false floors filled with pot to the United States, and speedboats from the coast to California. In Mexico we have a saying: He spread like humidity."

For years, Chapo shared the drug trade with other families in the federation. The Beltrán Leyva cartel was in charge of the traffic in Monterrey, and a former federal police officer known as "El Azul" ran Guadalajara. Amado Carrillo Fuentes, the cartel leader called "the Lord of the Skies," worked the border town of Ciudad Juárez, opposite El Paso. At the peak of his power, Fuentes was said to have paid $500 million a year in protection money. It was Fuentes who pioneered the traffic in Colombian coke, and who infamously died during plastic surgery to alter his appearance. (The two doctors alleged to have botched the operation were later found entombed in cement, their arms and legs bound.)

Over the past decade, however, that relatively stable structure has erupted into full-scale war — largely as the result of the unintended consequences of U.S. drug policy. When the Drug Enforcement Administration blocked cocaine shipments through the Caribbean during the 1980s, the trade simply migrated to overland routes through Mexico. Likewise, the DEA's success against the Cali and Medellín cartels in Colombia has only emboldened Mexico's narcos, driving the drug traffic ever closer to home. Newcomers on the Gulf Coast eager to break into the industry are challenging the rule of the existing cartels, sparking a bloody battle over territory and supply routes. And the Mexican government — under pressure from the United States to curb the flow of drugs — is waging an all-out campaign to destroy the cartels.

Indeed, much of the current bloodshed can be traced to the special forces that Mexico trained to find and arrest drug traffickers, receiving instruction from the U.S. military on tactics, intelligence-gathering, air assault and advanced weaponry. In the late 1990s, one of the new Gulf cartels began recruiting these American-trained soldiers to work as hired guns against the Sinaloan cartels, offering vastly higher wages than the government. Known as "Los Zetas" — the Mexican police's term for a high-ranking official — these mercenaries are now the most violent force in Mexico, moving massive amounts of drugs into the U.S. while murdering journalists and police and politicians who challenge their authority. Led by Heriberto "the Executioner" Lazcano, the Zeta paramilitaries are far more sophisticated in their weaponry and combat skills than the hapless and corruption-addled policía. It is as if the Navy SEALs or an FBI SWAT team went to work for the Russian mob.

Through the early part of the decade, the war steadily increased in intensity, but it was only with the inauguration of President Felipe Calderón in December 2006 that true chaos enveloped the nation. A conservative elected by a narrow margin, Calderón has made going after the drug traffickers a central part of his administration. He has deployed more than 40,000 federal soldiers across the country and imprisoned thousands of narcos, from lowly street dealers to drug lords and money launderers. But the result of Calderón's war has been catastrophe. In reply, the traffickers have directly attacked the legitimacy of the government, targeting politicians and senior law-enforcement officials. Ten days after Calderón took office, in what was seen as a message from the cartels, a cousin of his wife was killed and stuffed into the trunk of a car in Mexico City. In May, the chief of the federal police was gunned down in the capital. That same month, a village in the state of Chihuahua was overrun by 70 gunmen; the police chief and two officers were killed, the rest of the force quit in fear. In August, 12 decapitated bodies were left on the outskirts of Mérida on the Gulf Coast, the letter "Z" tattooed on their bodies, the calling card of Los Zetas. On September 15th — during a celebration of Mexican Independence Day — two fragmentation grenades exploded in the square of President Calderón's hometown of Morelia, killing eight civilians and wounding more than 100. The government's war on drugs has sparked a war on the government itself.

The war has now spread to America's own border. In three days in August, 43 people were killed in drug-related murders in and around Juárez, just across the river from El Paso. Experts agree that the violence could soon pose a threat to national security in America, with the already porous border turning into a floodgate for Mexican refugees and gangs. "I worry that the country's political class won't truly act until a major figure is assassinated," says Luis Astorga, a sociologist at the Institute of Social Research in Mexico City. "But right now it's not very clear what the 'war' means. No one is sure who is fighting who. It best resembles a circular firing squad."

[Read the entire story in the new issue of Rolling Stone, on stands October 30, 2008.]

Monday, November 3, 2008

Interpol agent passed information to Beltrán-Leyva cartel in Mexico

by Jacqui Goddard, The Times

One of the most dangerous drug cartels in the world has infiltrated the US Embassy in Mexico and America's top anti-trafficking agency, it emerged last night.

A captured informant codenamed Felipe admitted to Mexican prosecutors that he used his job as an Interpol agent working at the US Embassy in Mexico City and at the international airport in the city to feed classified information about anti-drug operations to the feared Beltrán-Leyva cartel.

The revelation came as prosecutors also admitted that two staff in the Mexican Attorney-General's Office for Organised Crime - a government unit that fights the drug mafia — had been found to have been in the pockets of the cartel for four years, as were at least three federal policemen with inside information on surveillance targets and potential raids. Each were paid between $150,000 (£97,000) and $450,000 a month by the cartel.

It was the worst known case of law enforcement in Mexico being compromised by drug lords since the arrest in 1997 of General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, the head of the country's anti-drug agency, who was convicted of assisting Amado Carrillo, a kingpin.

“This doesn't say much for US security — it's as embarrassing as hell for this to come out and I suspect heads will roll within the DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration],” said Bruce Bagley, an expert in Latin American drug trafficking, from the University of Miami in Florida.

The scandal came five days after Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, travelled to Mexico City to discuss the $400 million Mérida Initiative, a package to help Mexican and Central American law enforcement agencies to fight organised drug crime. “We've already achieved an outstanding level of co-operation in our efforts to fight drug trafficking and organised crime... the United States considers this important initiative and its implementation an urgent task,” she said.

President Calderón had appealed for the money, which will help to fund resources such as helicopters and surveillance aircraft, to be speeded up as Mexico struggles against a surge in drug violence.

The money will be filtered through the US Embassy in Mexico City.

The Beltrán-Leyva cartel is an offshoot of the Sinaloa cartel, the largest Mexican drug trafficking confederation, and has engaged in a bloody turf war as it strives for supremacy.

“It's a very big deal that they got inside the embassy and the DEA. The Beltrán-Leyva cartel has got a serious leg-up by doing this and while we don't know how much information they got, in this war knowledge is power,” Dr Bagley said. “These guys are an emerging player and they have to be taken seriously.”

Despite the corruption Mexico continues to capture top smugglers. On Saturday Eduardo Arellano Félix was arrested after a shootout in Tijuana. He had allegedly been running the Arellano Félix cartel with his sister.

Thursday, October 30, 2008

Narcos Infiltrate the Mexican Military

from Reforma
translated from the original Spanish by Kristin Bricker

A list of over 20 military agents allegedly for hire was found in one of the Beltrán Leyva brothers' safe houses in Culiacán, Sinaloa.

The information that was in a house belonging to Alfredo "El Mochomo" Beltrán Leyva, detained this past January 21, reveals that the Sinaloa clan had in its possession files from the Assistant Attorney General's Office for Specialized Investigation of Organized Crime (SIEDO in its Spanish initials) and from the Sinaloa Attorney General's office about investigations that were in process.

There was, for example, a two-page official letter from the SIEDO and a bundle of 148 pages of proceedings that the assistant attorney general's office was carrying out, documents which bore the official seal of the State Attorney General's Office.

But the most revealing finding in the search of the house at 1970 Juan de la Barrera, in the Burócratas de Culiacán district, was a professional notebook with red and blue pages, and yellow letters on the cover which say WOW. It was the Sinaloa Cartel's payroll for 2002 to date.

The Beltráns' notebook, with many different paystubs, mentions payments to the "Cousins," the name the drug traffickers gave to a network of military agents who allegedly passed on information about operations. For example, the Major of Military Justice Francisco de Jesús Pérez Chávez is listed with a payment of $150,000.

To Humberto Ramiro López Cornejo and Humberto Solís Galicia Barragán, a deposit of $70,000 each; for Alberto Cortina Herrera a sum of $75,000 is written; and to Pedro Sergio Jonguitud Barragán, $100,000.

Four of the five agents assigned to the Ninth Military Zone, located in Culiacán, as well as Ricardo Ramírez León, were detained on January 26, one week after the military captured "el Mochomo."

Those military agents were detained in April and are imprisoned in Occidente, Jalisco, charged with organized crime and crimes against the public health, in the category of collaborating to facilitate the trafficking and sale of drugs.

But they aren't the only ones mentioned in the list. Another page indicates payments to a Second Lieutenant "Calleja Bendaño" and specifies a bank account for depositing $100,000.

In another notebook there's another, larger account of people with military ranks who were also allegedly receiving money. There are others who don't have a military rank indicated.

That list mentions Captain Bernal Román Parra and a Captain Pacheco, as well as Second Lieutenants Izat Rodríguez Meza and Édgar Villatoros de los Santos.

There were also the following names: Gabriel Álvarez Guevara, Gregorio Pérez Manjarrez, Francisco Javier Mejía Rodríguez, Efrén Lugo, Óscar Pardo Jiménez, Juan Carlos Facundo López, Cristóbal Santiago Luna, Cesáreo Martínez Cruz, and Óscar Ramos, whose name has a note that says "El Rojo por Tapia". Their military ranks aren't listed, although they are on the same list.

The notebook contains entries that date from 2002. Second Lieutenant Fidencio Hernández Martínez, Lieutenant Marco Antonio Vázquez Herrera, and José Inocente Santana García, all members of the 65 Infantry Battalion, are also listed. They were imprisoned in 2002 for protecting drug cultivation on Sinaloa's border with Chihuahua.

After finding this information, the Mexican Military proceeded to capture some of its agents and handed them over to the Federal Attorney General's Office (PGR in its Spanish initials). It was the only institution that has initiated proceedings against its own.


Timeline

Arturo, Héctor y Alfredo Beltrán Leyva built their drug empire in Sinaloa, Morelos, and Mexico City with bribes and complicity.

2008

January 21
Alfredo Beltrán is captured in Culiacán. A week later, five military agents accused of leaking information to the Beltrán cartel fall.

January 22
In Mexico City, eleven members of a cell that operated out of houses in Coyoacán, San Ángel, and El Pedregal fall, with bullet-proof vests that said FEDA (Arturo Federal Forces). [translator's note: the REDA is the private army of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, head of the Sinaloa cartel.

April 30
Following a confrontation that lasted over 45 minutes in Culiacán, 13 alleged Beltrán hitmen are detained; three more die in the confrontation.

May 7
Three ex-military agents are detained along with another seven Beltrán hitmen following a confrontation on the Cuernavaca-Acapulco highway. Arturo Beltrán allegedly managed to escape.

May 8
Édgar Millán is executed in Mexico City, allegedly under the Beltrán Leyva family's orders. [translator's note: Édgar Millán was Mexico's top federal drug cop. He was executed just before US Congress voted on Plan Mexico. His assassination was an important lobbying tool utilized by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in convincing Congress that Plan Mexico was necessary and desired in Mexico. Millán's assassination was obviously an inside job: his assassins knew which of his multiple houses he would be staying at that night, they knew how to evade his bodyguards, and they appeared to have entered his house with keys.]

May 9
Édgar Guzmán Beltrán, son of Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, is executed in a shopping center parking lot.

May 27
Eight federal police die during a confrontation with Beltrán hitmen in Culiacán.

July 14
Car bombs explode in front of a house in Culiacán where a Beltrán cell was at the time. The cell managed to escape.

September 14
Military and federal agents seize over USD$26 million from the Sinaloa Cartel.

October 27
The PGR makes known a red of high-ranking officials and AFI [Federal Investigation Agency] agents who were leaking information to the Beltrán family.

Wednesday, October 29, 2008

Rice Refuses to Rule Out Deployment of Armed US Agents under Plan Mexico

During a recent visit to Mexico, the US Secretary of State discusses Plan Mexico, security cooperation, and the war on drugs

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refused to rule out the deployment of armed US agents to Mexico under Plan Mexico during a recent visit to Mexico. While US and Mexican officials have been adamant that US military forces will not be deployed to Mexico, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will be deployed to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean as part of the initiative. Now the big question on everyone's mind is, "What other US agents will be deployed, and will they come armed?"

Reporters questioned Rice about the possibility of armed US agents on Mexican soil on at least three separate occasions during her visit to Mexico. Each time she avoided answering definitively.

In an October 23 interview, Rice told Televisa's Leonardo Kourchenko that some aspects of the Merida Initiative, also known as Plan Mexico, can already go forward. Kourchenko responded, "Armed agents, for instance."

Rice replied: "Yes. And so we think that this is--" Then she corrects herself: "Armed agents? No. We're going to respect Mexican law, and the Mexican Government is in control on this issue."

Kourchenko pushes for a more concrete answer. "There won't be American agents armed in the Mexican territory?"

Rice stumbles to avoid a yes-or-no answer yet again: "We will--the Mexican Government has complete control over how this is carried out. But this is to make Mexican security forces more capable, not to impose American security forces on Mexico."

Later, in a press conference with Mexico's Foreign Relations Secretary Patricia Espinosa, reporters pose the armed agents question to Rice again: "With regards to the arrival of the United States companies and the Merida Initiative, what relationship will the Mexican Government have with the private contractors from the United States? And I would like to ask you, in particular, will we allow armed personnel to be here in Mexico?"

This is a very important question. The day after George Bush signed Plan Mexico into law, leaked videos appeared in the press that depicted US-based private contractors teaching torture tactics to Leon, Guanajuato, police as part of the war on organized crime. Government officials from Calderon's PAN party paid for the training and publicly defended its legality and usefulness after the tapes hit the international press. And while both Mexican and US officials have publicly stated that no US soldiers will be deployed to Mexico under Plan Mexico, Mexican critics have argued that the US Defense Department is skilled at using private contractors to fulfill military functions, often with disastrous consequences. So how does Rice respond the third time reporters ask her if the US government will deploy armed agents to Mexico?

"Well... on the matter of migration and [inaudible] policies. The problem--we all have problems with migration. We and Mexico have discussed this issue. In fact, the President has been a major proponent of comprehensive immigration reform in the United States.... I sincerely hope that comprehensive immigration reform will come in the United States in the next administration. It really needs to."

Rice goes on to rail against Cuba, and then wraps up her answer by declaring how proud she is that Mexico and the United States are friends.

Secretary Espinosa then steps up in an attempt to answer the question without really answering it: "In no way will there be any North American agents armed in our country that will be performing activities that are limited by our law for the Mexican Government officials."

The big question, then, is: what activities are limited by Mexican law, and--perhaps more importantly--which ones are not?

One of the stated purposes of the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP)--of which Plan Mexico is a significant component--is increased cooperation between various militaries and law enforcement agencies. As a result of the SPP, Canada and the US signed an agreement on February 14, 2008, that allows both countries' troops to cross into the other's territory in the event of an emergency.

Secretary Rice's trip to Mexico included work on a similar cooperation agreement between Mexico and the United States for emergency management in the case of natural disasters and accidents. The details of the agreement have not been released, and it is unknown if the new agreement would permit US troops to cross into Mexican soil in the case of an "emergency."

However, Mexican troops have already been deployed to the United States in response to a national disaster. Following Hurricane Katrina, 196 uniformed Mexican soldiers helped out with relief operations in San Antonio, Texas.

"No Other Way"

During her visit, Rice shed some light on the Bush administration's priorities in the war on drugs in Mexico. Despite numerous criticisms that law enforcement strategies for dealing with the drug trade are bound to fail if the demand for drugs is not addressed, the Bush administration did not prioritize treatment in Plan Mexico. Bush's original proposal contained no money for drug treatment in Mexico, and Congress added only a nominal amount for drug treatment in its plan. Plan Mexico has not been met with a corresponding increase in funds for drug treatment in the US, which is the primary market for drugs that pass through the Central America-Mexico corridor.

When asked if a military/law enforcement strategy is "the proper and right strategy" to combat the drug trade, Rice responded, "I see no other way than to be very tough on organized crime, to be capable of dealing with these very violent people who are trying to terrorize the population, who are trying to carry out their criminal activities. I see no other way."

Dr. Rice has obviously not read studies that show that drug treatment is much more cost effective than law enforcement strategies.

Rewriting History

Rice also rewrote Mexican history during her interview with Televisa in order to justify President Felipe Calderon's highly controversial use of the military to combat drug cartels and perform police duties in the war on organized crime. When asked for her opinion on Calderon's military strategy, Rice told Televisa, "Mexico is a democratic country with a democratically elected president who has gone to his people, gone to his legislative branch, and developed this strategy."

There are several factual errors in Rice's statement. The first is regarding Calderon's status as a "democratically elected president." Calderon took the presidency thanks to massive voter fraud in 2006. Urns stuffed full of uncounted votes turned up in dumpsters in zones that overwhelmingly supported opposition candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Vote tallies were padded in favor of Calderon. Entire pro-Calderon precincts were counted twice in the final tally. Ballot boxes were found stuffed full of illegal votes. In some polling places, there were more illegal votes than actual voters. Narco News has demonstrated that these fraudulent practices combined clearly tipped the election in Calderon's favor.

Rice is also incorrect when she states that Calderon went to the legislative branch to develop his military strategy. Far from being a plan developed along with the legislative branch, Calderon deployed the troops without seeking Congress' approval first. Calderon's strategy of utilizing the military for policing functions is highly controversial, to the point where some members of Congress have considered revoking Calderon's authority to deploy troops without congressional approval. It's not even clear if Calderon's use of the troops is legal: Gen. Jose Francisco Gallardo notes that the use of the military in civilian police jurisdictions violates Article 21 of the Mexican constitution.

Monday, October 27, 2008

High-ranking Mexican officials detained; they were working for the Beltrán Leyva cartel

Arrests within the Mexican Assistant Attorney General's Office on Organized Crime are only the latest; Drug traffickers may also have informants in Interpol and the US Embassy

by Agencias and La Jornada On Line
translation and notes by Kristin Bricker

Mexico City - The Federal Attorney General's office (PGR in its Spanish initials) announced the detention of two high-ranking officials from the Assistant Attorney General's Office for the Specialized Investigation of Organized Crime (SIEDO in its Spanish initials) for alleged connections with with the Beltrán Leyva brothers' criminal organization, which paid them up to USD$400,000 monthly.

The head of SIEDO, Marisela Morales Ibáñez, stated that Fernando Rivera Hernández was handed over to the Federal Prosecutor's Office. Rivera Hernández acted as deputy director of Intelligence in SIEDO's Technical Coordinating Body.

Rivera Hernández is accused of receiving "large sums of money" on behalf of the Beltrán Leyva brothers. On August 4 he was held for 40 days under pre-trail detention following a deposition from a protected witness. He was then held for an additional 30 days.

Morales Ibáñez said that on October 10 criminal proceedings were initiated against Fernando Rivera for crimes related to organized crime and against the public health,* in the category of conspiracy to encourage the possibility of committing those crimes. The 9th Criminal Court in Jalisco issued an arrest warrant for him on October 11. A few days later he was indicted and formally imprisoned.

Miguel Colorado González, SIEDO's technical coordinator, was also targeted by the criminal proceedings. Both were providing information about operations that the Federal Investigation Agency (AFI in its Spanish initials) would carry out against drug trafficking, stated Morales Ibáñez in the press conference.

Both ex-officials are being detained in the Puente Grande maximum security prison in Jalisco, where Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, aka El Mochomo, is also being held. Alfredo Beltrán is one of the leaders of the cartel that Arturo Beltrán runs. Arturo Beltrán is currently at large.

Attorney General Eduardo Medina Mora stated that between July and now, 35 Mexican Prosecutor's Office agents have been detained for receiving bribes of between $150,00 and $450,000 USD monthly, according to his data.

The process of purging and investigating personnel will continue, said Medina Mora. Likewise, the assistant attorney general said that the investigations against SIEDO agents began in 2004, "as a result of thwarted operations and a formal deposition that stated that there were public servants who were passing information to the Sinaloa cartel."

The arrests of more public servants from this institution are expected. The arrests began this past July. The public servants belong to a wide network of corruption within the SIEDO. The investigations have not concluded, said Morales.

It was unofficially said that the government will investigate a series of statements which indicate that drug traffickers have informants in Interpol and the United States Embassy in Mexico.

Notes:
* Mexico has a highly controversial track for crimes related to organized crime. This track is different from the standard criminal track: organized crime suspects have fewer rights, can be held incomunicado for longer periods of time, and face longer prison sentences. Crimes against public health also fall under the organized crime rubric.